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Summary of the Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament

Core Content

The Global Fissile Material Report 2009 is the fourth annual report by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), an independent group of arms-control and nonproliferation experts from seventeen countries. The report focuses on the technical and policy dimensions of nuclear disarmament, emphasizing the importance of controlling fissile materials—highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—as the foundation for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons.

Main Points

• Mission of the IPFM: To analyze the technical basis for policy initiatives to secure, consolidate, and reduce fissile material stockpiles, which are essential for nuclear weapons.

• Fissile Materials and Nuclear Disarmament:

  • The global stockpile of HEU is about 1600 ± 300 tons, enough for over 60,000 nuclear weapons.
  • The global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 500 ± 25 tons, sufficient for more than 60,000 first-generation nuclear weapons.
  • These materials are critical for both nuclear weapons and nuclear power, making their control vital for disarmament and nonproliferation.

• Nuclear Weapon States:

  • Nine countries currently possess nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
  • The U.S. and Russia have the largest stockpiles, with the U.S. at 9400 warheads (including 4200 awaiting dismantlement) and Russia at 10,000 warheads (with a large portion awaiting dismantlement).
  • Other nuclear weapon states have smaller stockpiles, with France at fewer than 300, the U.K. at 185, and China at about 240.

• Disarmament Efforts:

  • The U.S. and Russia agreed in 2009 to reduce their deployed strategic warheads to 1500–1675 each by the end of 2009, with further reductions planned by 2016.
  • The U.S. dismantles about 350 warheads per year, while Russia dismantles 200–300 warheads per year.
  • The U.S. and Russia have historically dismantled at higher rates (1300–2000 per year in the 1990s), but current rates are lower.

• Civilian Stockpiles:

  • Civilian HEU is used in over 100 reactors worldwide, sufficient to make about one thousand Hiroshima-type bombs.
  • Civilian plutonium stockpiles, mostly from nuclear power reactors, are also significant and could be used for weapons if not properly managed.

• Verification and Safeguards:

  • A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) is seen as a key step in nuclear disarmament, requiring verifiable measures to monitor fissile material production and stockpiles.
  • The report emphasizes the need for comprehensive historical declarations and international monitoring to ensure that fissile materials are not diverted for weapons.
  • Nuclear archaeology—the use of isotopic analysis and other methods to verify past production—plays a central role in this process.

• Disposal of Fissile Materials:

  • Disposing of HEU and plutonium is essential for irreversible disarmament.
  • The U.S. and Russia have down-blended about 700 tons of HEU to LEU for civilian use, but weapon-grade plutonium has not yet been disposed of.
  • The report calls for alternative disposition options for excess plutonium and for placing all excess HEU and plutonium under IAEA monitoring.

• Nuclear Power and Disarmament:

  • Nuclear power facilities, including reprocessing and enrichment plants, pose a risk of proliferation if not properly controlled.
  • A nuclear-weapon-free world would require strict monitoring of all fuel-cycle facilities, regardless of the country.

• Societal Verification:

  • A robust verification system must include technical measures and citizen reporting.
  • Citizens are unlikely to report suspicious nuclear activities unless all states have convincingly committed to nuclear disarmament.

Key Information

• IPFM Members: Experts from Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
• IPFM Leadership: Co-chaired by Professor R. Rajaraman (India) and Professor Frank von Hippel (U.S.).
• New Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Two new zones came into force in 2009, covering Central Asia and Africa, with a total of 57 countries now in such zones.
• IAEA Role: The IAEA is critical for monitoring nuclear materials and verifying declarations, especially in non-weapon states.
• Plutonium and HEU Disposition: Disposal of these materials is necessary to make disarmament irreversible and to prevent reproduction of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

The report underscores the importance of technical verification, international cooperation, and transparency in achieving and sustaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. It highlights the need for a comprehensive Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, the role of nuclear archaeology, and the importance of societal verification in ensuring that fissile materials are not misused. The ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons through secure management of their key components—HEU and plutonium.