2013年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Saudi_Arabia_Financial_Sector_Assessment_Program_UpdateDetailed_Assessment_of_Observance_of_the_IOSCO_Objectives_and_Principles_of_Securities_Regulation_79页_817kb
报告摘要
Saudi Arabia: Financial Sector Assessment Program Update—Detailed Assessment of Observance of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
Core Content
This document provides a detailed assessment of the implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation in Saudi Arabia, based on information available up to September 2011. It was prepared by the IMF as part of a periodic consultation with the Saudi government and includes findings and recommendations for improving regulatory effectiveness and transparency in the securities market.
Main Findings and Recommendations
A. Executive Summary
- The Capital Market Authority (CMA) has made significant progress in establishing its regulatory framework and supervision capabilities since the enactment of the Capital Market Law (CML) in 2004.
- The CMA has entered into information-sharing agreements with regional regulators and is a signatory to the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU), but no such arrangement exists with SAMA.
- There are no major gaps in the current regulatory and legal frameworks, but transparency and procedural improvements are needed, especially in how the CMA funds its operations, disciplines regulated entities, and communicates with members.
- The CML and its implementing regulations are still relatively new and require ongoing revision and updating.
- The CMA should increase transparency regarding noncompliance cases, particularly those involving Authorized Persons (APs), as some sanctions are not published.
- The CMA approach to supervision is risk-based and compliance-focused, but the cost of compliance needs to be more central in establishing mandatory obligations.
B. Introduction
- The Saudi capital market has been operating since 1970 and was previously regulated by a ministerial committee involving the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), and SAMA.
- The CML and CMA were established in 2004, giving the CMA rule-making and enforcement powers to protect investors, reduce systemic risk, and ensure market fairness, efficiency, and transparency.
- The CMA has civil and criminal authority, including the ability to impose warnings, monetary penalties, property seizure, and license suspension or revocation.
C. Information and Methodology
- The assessment was based on public information, CMA supervisory material, and interviews with regulated entities and CMA staff.
- It followed the IOSCO Principles and Objectives as updated in 2008, with the MMOU being a key part of the regulatory cooperation framework.
- Principle 30 (securities settlement systems) was not assessed due to a separate standard.
- The CMA has not yet developed a revised methodology for assessing the implementation of the updated IOSCO Principles.
D. Regulatory and Market Structure
Regulatory Structure
- The CMA is responsible for regulating the securities market, including issuance, listing, trading, and settlement on Tadawul, the Saudi stock exchange.
- It oversees credit rating agencies, investment funds, disclosure by issuers, corporate governance, licensing, and enforcement.
- The CMA has rule-making authority and is accountable to the President of the Council of Ministers.
- The CMA Board consists of five members, with the CEO as chairman. The Board has no statutory protection from legal action and has limited transparency in its disciplinary actions.
- The CRSD is a special body with exclusive jurisdiction over securities disputes and operates under the CML.
Market Structure
- Tadawul is the only licensed market in Saudi Arabia and operates as a joint stock company under the Companies Law.
- As of December 2010, there were 146 listed companies with a total market capitalization of $353.44 billion.
- Mutual funds totaled 267, with assets under management of SR94.666 billion.
- ETFs were introduced in 2010, with 2 ETFs operating.
- APs (Authorized Persons) totaled 97 as of December 2010, with 263 foreign-affiliated licenses.
- Swaps are used for foreign participation, but direct foreign participation in equities is not allowed.
- The CMA has not yet developed rules for alternative trading systems or new exchanges.
E. Effective Regulation
- The CMA has introduced substantive reforms in the securities market, including the CML and Implementing Regulations.
- The Fit for Future project has led to organizational changes and staff expansion.
- The CMA has licensed new entrants but requires numerous approvals and notifications, which may impede business operations.
- Derivatives trading, regulated short selling, and stock borrowing/lending are absent in the market.
- The CMA should consider measures to increase liquidity, especially given the predominance of retail investors.
- Shareholder rights in new issues are not tradable, and the CMA has not yet established a mechanism to trade such rights on the market.
F. Principle by Principle Assessment
| Principle | Grading | Findings |
|---|---|---|
| Principle 1 | PI | The CMA is the single entity responsible for administering the CML. The CML clearly defines its objectives and powers. However, there is no mention of the division of responsibilities between the CMA, MOCI, and other entities. |
| Principle 2 | PI | The CMA is operationally independent and autonomous, but statutory protections for its independence are limited. The CMA has a publications policy, but not all decisions are published. |
| Principle 3 | FI | The CMA has adequate powers and authorities under the CML, but resources and capacity need to be enhanced. |
| Principle 4 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to enforce regulations, but enforcement transparency is limited. |
| Principle 5 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to conduct inspections and investigations, but disclosure of disciplinary fines is inconsistent. |
| Principle 6 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to conduct surveillance and monitoring, but market monitoring is limited. |
| Principle 7 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market conduct, but regulatory enforcement is not fully transparent. |
| Principle 8 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate issuer disclosure, but disclosure requirements for private placements are not well-defined. |
| Principle 9 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate corporate governance, but responsibilities overlap with MOCI. |
| Principle 10 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate securities intermediaries, but regulatory clarity is limited. |
| Principle 11 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market transparency, but transparency in noncompliance cases is inadequate. |
| Principle 12 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market integrity, but enforcement actions are not fully transparent. |
| Principle 13 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market participants, but discipline mechanisms are not well-documented. |
| Principle 14 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market access, but foreign participation is limited. |
| Principle 15 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market conduct, but self-regulatory organizations (SROs) are not present. |
| Principle 16 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate investment funds, but legal form and structure have not been tested. |
| Principle 17 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate securities settlement, but settlement systems are not assessed. |
| Principle 18 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate accounting and auditing, but standards are set by SOCPA, not the CMA. |
| Principle 19 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate disclosure requirements, but private placement disclosures are limited. |
| Principle 20 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate corporate governance, but responsibilities overlap with MOCI. |
| Principle 21 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market participants, but risk-based supervision is not fully implemented. |
| Principle 22 | FI | The CMA has adequate capital requirements for APs, but no documented process exists for handling AP failures. |
| Principle 23 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market transparency, but disclosure of noncompliance is inadequate. |
| Principle 24 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market integrity, but enforcement transparency is limited. |
| Principle 25 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market conduct, but discipline mechanisms are not fully transparent. |
| Principle 26 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market participants, but risk-based supervision is not fully implemented. |
| Principle 27 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market integrity, but enforcement transparency is limited. |
| Principle 28 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market participants, but risk-based supervision is not fully implemented. |
| Principle 29 | PI | The CMA has adequate powers to regulate market conduct, but discipline mechanisms are not fully transparent. |
| Principle 30 | N/A | Not assessed due to a separate standard for securities settlement systems. |
Key Recommendations
- Enhance transparency in noncompliance cases and regulatory decisions.
- Ensure public availability of mandatory regulatory instructions and Board decisions.
- Improve compliance and control mechanisms for regulated entities.
- Develop risk-based supervision and enforcement transparency.
- Consider measures to increase liquidity and foreign participation in equities.
- Clarify responsibilities and overlaps between the CMA, MOCI, and other regulatory bodies.
- Establish a documented process to handle unexpected AP failures.
- Review and revise the CML and implementing regulations as needed.
- Consider introducing SROs and qualified investor exemptions for foreign participation.
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