战略与国际研究中心-Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-in-Iraq_25页_136kb

Summary of "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq" by Anthony H. Cordesman

Core Content

This document provides a detailed analysis of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, particularly focusing on chemical, biological, and missile capabilities, as of September 1999. It outlines the extent of Iraq's pre-Gulf War WMD infrastructure, the impact of the Gulf War and subsequent UN inspections, and the ongoing development efforts despite international sanctions.

Main Points

Missile Programs

• Pre-Gulf War Capabilities:
  Iraq had extensive delivery systems including long-range strike aircraft (Tu-16, Tu-22, MiG-29, Mirage F-1, MiG-23BM, Su-22) and a large Scud missile force (minimum 819 missiles), some with chemical warheads.
  It also developed extended-range Al Husayn Scud variants (600 km range) and the Al-Abbas missile (900 km range), capable of reaching targets in Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Cyprus.
  Iraq was working on long-range super guns with up to 600 km range.

• Post-Gulf War Developments:
  Despite UN inspections, Iraq retained significant missile technology and capabilities.
  It continued developing missiles within the 150 km range limit, including the Al Samoud (liquid-propellant) and Ababil-100 (solid-propellant) programs.
  These programs were under UNSCOM supervision and showed technological improvements that could be applied to future longer-range systems.

• Missile Stockpile and Destruction:
  UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 48 Scud-type missiles and verified the unilateral destruction of 83 more.
  However, Iraq was found to have concealed additional missile assets, including warheads and launchers.
  There is evidence that Iraq may still have components for several dozen extended-range Scud missiles.

• ICBM Development:
  US intelligence suggests that Iraq could test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the United States within 15 years, using either Scud components or foreign assistance (e.g., North Korea's Taepo Dong-2).
  Analysts differ on the timeline, with some believing it could be as early as 2010 if foreign assistance is obtained.

Chemical Weapons

• Chemical Warfare Agents:
  Iraq produced and stockpiled mustard gas, Sarin, and VX nerve gas. It had the capacity to manufacture up to 70 tons of VX, with significant precursors stored.
  It developed binary and more stable chemical agents post-Gulf War.

• Delivery Systems:
  Iraq had missile warheads, rockets, aerial bombs, and artillery shells for chemical agents. It also had spray dispersal systems for effective dissemination.

• Production Facilities:
  The primary facility was Muthanna, where chemical agents were produced, filled, and stored. Other sites included Salman Pak, Samara, and Habbiniyah.
  Many of these facilities were rebuilt after the Gulf War.

• UN Destruction Efforts:
  UNSCOM supervised the destruction of 38,537 chemical munitions, 690 tons of agents, and over 3,000 tons of precursors.
  It also destroyed 325 pieces of production equipment and 125 analytic instruments.
  Despite these efforts, Iraq is believed to have concealed significant stocks of precursors and production equipment.

• Chemical Weapon Stockpile:
  Iraq had at least 3,800 kg of VX agents and 12–16 missile warheads before the Gulf War.
  The UN estimates that Iraq may have produced an additional 600 tons of chemical agents, with discrepancies between declared and actual quantities.

• Covert Imports:
  Iraq attempted to import chemical precursors and equipment through Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan post-Gulf War.

Biological Weapons

• Program Structure:
  Iraq had a highly compartmented and secretive biological weapons program with 18 major sites.
  These sites were often unmarked and lacked visible security, making them difficult to detect.

• Agent Development:
  Iraq tested and weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. It also explored the use of viruses, bacteria, and fungi for biological warfare.
  Research included the potential weaponization of gas gangrene and mycotoxins.

• Weaponization Activities:
  Iraq weaponized at least three biological agents for use in the Gulf War, including 100 bombs and 16 missile warheads with botulinum, 50 R-400 bombs and 5 warheads with anthrax, and 4 warheads and 7 bombs with aflatoxin.
  It armed 155 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets with biological agents and conducted field trials and live firings.

• Deployment and Testing:
  Iraq developed and stored drop tanks for dispersing biological agents, and conducted tests using spray tanks on Mirage aircraft.
  It also used crop spraying helicopters and held exercises simulating the dispersal of anthrax spores.

• UN Findings:
  UNSCOM found that Iraq had not provided a clear account of its biological weapons program and that it retained the technology and capabilities to continue development.
  Iraq's claims of destruction were not verified, and there were unaccounted for biological agents and equipment.

Key Information

• UN Supervision and Destruction:
  UNSCOM destroyed a significant number of chemical and biological weapons, but Iraq's claims of destruction were often unverified.
  The agency found that Iraq had not fully accounted for its missile and WMD assets, including warheads, launchers, and precursors.

• Concealment and Deception:
  Iraq concealed its missile production facilities and chemical/biological weapons capabilities.
  It systematically lied to the UN about its biological program until 1995 and continued to mislead after that.

• Continuity of Capabilities:
  Despite UN sanctions and inspections, Iraq retained the technology, infrastructure, and personnel needed to develop and produce WMDs.
  It had the capacity to reconstitute its pre-war capabilities once sanctions were lifted.

• Recent Intelligence:
  The CIA reported that Iraq continued to acquire dual-use items for WMD programs, and had rebuilt key chemical production facilities for potential reactivation.
  There were indications that Iraq had weaponized VX and produced more biological agents than declared.

Conclusion

Iraq's WMD programs, particularly in chemical and biological warfare, were extensive and well-developed before the Gulf War. Despite the destruction of many assets under UN supervision, the country retained significant capabilities and continued covert development. The UN and US intelligence agencies concluded that Iraq had not fully accounted for its WMD stockpiles and was still capable of reconstituting its programs. The document highlights the persistence of Iraq's WMD ambitions and the challenges in verifying their complete destruction.