战略与国际研究中心-Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-in-Iran-and-Iraq_89页_302kb

Summary of "Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iran and Iraq"

Core Content

This document, authored by Anthony H. Cordesman and published in March 2000, provides an analysis of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the Middle East, focusing on Iran and Iraq. It outlines the motivations, capabilities, and strategic implications of WMD development and use in the region, as well as the effectiveness of arms control mechanisms.

Main Points and Key Information

Part One: Causes, Warfighting Options, and Arms Control

• Motivations for Proliferation:

  • The perceived benefits of WMDs outweigh the risks, especially for states with conventional military weaknesses.
  • Prestige, deterrence, and intimidation are key drivers.
  • Regional conflicts (e.g., Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War) have demonstrated the use of WMDs against both military and civilian targets.
  • Proliferation is often a response to arms races with neighbors and the desire to limit external power projection.

• Warfighting Options:

  • WMDs are used for covert, indirect, and unconventional warfare, including terrorism.
  • Surprise attacks and preemption are common strategies.
  • WMDs may be used to alter the strategic nature of conflict, especially in cases of existential threat.
  • Asymmetric escalation and controlled escalation ladders are likely.

• Arms Control Challenges:

  • Arms control regimes often fail to provide security to non-proliferators and may even hinder them.
  • The CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) lack enforcement mechanisms.
  • The NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and IAEA inspections are limited in effectiveness, especially for undeclared facilities.
  • Dual-use technologies make it easier for states to develop WMDs without full disclosure.

Part Two: Who is Proliferating

• Proliferation is Already Established:

  • Israel: Has nuclear weapons and relies on deterrence and preemption.
  • Iran: Has chemical and biological weapons, and a nuclear program.
  • Iraq: Has a history of WMD use (1983–1988) and covert capabilities.
  • Syria: Has significant chemical capabilities and is likely to acquire biological ones.
  • Libya: Continues chemical development.
  • Algeria and Egypt: Uncertain status, but both are potential proliferators.
  • Terrorists and Extremists: May acquire WMD capabilities through proxies or state support.

• Unstable Adversary Combinations:

  • Iran vs. Iraq
  • Iraq vs. Southern Gulf, US, and Israel
  • Israel vs. Syria
  • Iran vs. Southern Gulf, US, and Israel
  • Libya and Algeria as "wild cards"
  • Saudi Arabia may join the proliferation trend in response to Iran and Iraq.

Part Three: Proliferation in Iran

• Missile Systems:

  • Scud B (R-17E): The core of Iran's missile force, acquired from Libya and North Korea.
  • Scud C: More advanced, with a range of up to 500 kilometers, likely based on Chinese DF-61 technology.
  • No-Dong: A longer-range missile with potential nuclear and biological capabilities, possibly with a range of 1,240–1,700 miles.
  • Tapeo Dong 1 and 2: Developmental IRBMs with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers.

• Missile Production and Development:

  • Iran is developing indigenous missile capabilities, including solid and liquid-fueled systems.
  • It is likely to produce its own longer-range variants of the No-Dong missile with Russian and Chinese assistance.
  • Iran has assembled Scud and Scud C missiles using foreign components and may soon manufacture entire systems domestically.

• Delivery and Concealment:

  • Iran has mobile launchers and is testing new systems.
  • It has developed shelters and tunnels to protect its missile infrastructure.
  • It may be working with Syria on WMD development, using its facilities as a transshipment point.

Part Four: Proliferation in Iraq

• Chemical and Biological Capabilities:

  • Iraq had a significant chemical warfare program during the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf War.
  • It also had covert biological programs, which may have been reactivated after the end of UNSCOM inspections.

• Missile Programs:

  • Iraq had a covert missile program, including Scud C and other systems.
  • It had access to Scud technology and may have developed more advanced systems.

Part Five: Iraqi Breakout Capabilities

• Breakout Potential:
  • Iraq could quickly reconstitute its WMD programs if arms control efforts fail.
  • It may have the capability to produce biological and chemical weapons without full disclosure.
  • Its missile program includes long-range systems like the Scud C, and it may have developed more advanced variants.

Part Six: Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare

• Terrorism and WMDs:
  • WMDs are often used as a tool for terrorism and proxy warfare.
  • The use of unconventional delivery systems and delayed effects complicates detection and response.
  • "Cocktail" attacks (mixing different agents) are a growing concern.
  • Authoritarian leaders may lack the technical understanding to manage WMD risks effectively.

Part Seven: Lethality and Effects of WMDs

• Comparative Lethality:

  • Nuclear weapons are the most lethal, followed by chemical and biological.
  • Biological weapons are more effective in aerosol form.
  • Chemical weapons are more versatile and easier to produce.

• Uncertainties:

  • Accuracy, reliability, and effectiveness of WMDs remain uncertain.
  • The use of WMDs may lead to unintended consequences, such as collateral damage.
  • WMDs could escalate conflicts to "total war" if perceived as a last resort.

Part Eight: Deterrence, Defense, and Counterproliferation

• Arms Control Limitations:

  • Arms control is not sufficient to prevent proliferation.
  • Deterrence and counterproliferation are seen as extensions of conflict rather than security measures.
  • Effective defense against WMDs is challenging due to the lack of reliable CEP (Circular Error Probable) data and the difficulty of detecting covert programs.

• Strategic Implications:

  • WMDs can be used to force conflict termination or deter external intervention.
  • Regional stability is threatened by the potential for escalation and asymmetric warfare.

Conclusion

The document highlights the growing proliferation of WMDs in the Middle East, driven by a combination of strategic, political, and technological factors. While arms control mechanisms like the NPT, IAEA, and CWC exist, they are often ineffective in preventing or detecting covert programs. The development of WMDs by Iran and Iraq, along with the potential for state-sponsored terrorism, poses a serious threat to regional and global security. The document also emphasizes the need for more robust and intrusive inspection regimes to effectively counter proliferation.