2015年-IMF国际货币组织全球_South_Africa_Financial_Sector_Assessment_Program_252页_1mb

Detailed Assessment of Implementation on the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation in South Africa

Core Content

This report is a detailed assessment of how South Africa implements the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, conducted as part of the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in May 2014. It evaluates the regulatory framework, market structure, supervisory and enforcement mechanisms, and identifies areas for improvement.

Main Points

Legal and Regulatory Framework

• The legal framework is robust and provides the Financial Services Board (FSB) with broad supervisory, investigative, and enforcement powers.
• Accounting and auditing standards are high and internationally acceptable.
• The Financial Markets Act (FMA), which replaced the Securities Services Act (SSA) in 2013, focuses on licensing and regulating market infrastructures, prohibiting insider trading, and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.
• The Credit Rating Services Act (CRSA), enacted in 2013, introduces a framework for the registration and supervision of credit rating agencies.

Market Infrastructure

• The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) is the only securities exchange in South Africa and is a public company listed on its main board.
• Strate (Pty) Ltd serves as the central securities depository (CSD) and clearing house for equities and bonds, jointly owned by the JSE and four major South African banks.
• SAFCOM (Safex Clearing Company) is the clearing house for derivatives.
• The JSE manages pre-settlement processes and can require margin for open positions.
• Settlement for equities and bonds occurs through Strate.

Market Structure and Participants

• The number of JSE members has remained stable over the past three years, with a decline in equity derivatives members.
• Foreign direct membership on the JSE is prohibited, but foreign subsidiaries of member firms are not regulated by the JSE, limiting access to information.
• The percentage of firms owned domestically is higher than in many jurisdictions, with 48% owned by local private or listed companies.
• Unregulated hedge funds manage approximately USD 10 billion in assets, mainly in trusts and partnerships.
• The fund management industry is significant, with ZAR 1.5 trillion (USD 161 billion) in assets under management (AUM) in 2013, managed by 48 fund managers across 1,084 portfolios.

Supervisory Structure

• The securities regulatory structure is complex, with responsibilities divided among multiple authorities and market infrastructures.
• The FSB oversees collective investment schemes (CIS) and exchanges, but supervision of market intermediaries is shared with the JSE.
• The FSB has limited powers over issuer supervision, which is handled by the JSE and CIPC.
• The FSB has sufficient funding and authority, but staff expertise is a challenge in transitioning to the twin peaks model.
• Supervisory cooperation is intended to reduce systemic risk and regulatory fragmentation, but optimal structures are not yet in place.

Governance and Independence

• The FSB's governance structure raises concerns about independence, particularly due to industry members on Board Committees and the Minister of Finance's authority to remove Board or Executive Committee members for non-misconduct reasons.
• The government has recognized the need for greater regulatory independence, as reflected in the twin peaks bill.
• The independence of the IRBA should also be strengthened.

Enforcement and Compliance

• The FSB has broad enforcement powers, including inspections, investigations, and surveillance.
• Enforcement actions should be more frequent, including criminal prosecutions.
• The CIS framework is less comprehensive and intrusive compared to other areas, with substantial gaps in disclosure and valuation standards.
• Capital and reporting requirements for financial services providers (FSPs) should be strengthened.

Key Findings

• The legal framework is complete in several areas but needs enhancement in others.
• The market infrastructure is robust for a domestic-oriented market.
• The FSB has sufficient powers but faces challenges in coordination and staff expertise.
• The CIS framework lacks comprehensiveness and intrusiveness.
• The FSB's independence is questionable due to governance arrangements and ministerial influence.

Recommendations

• The FSB should ensure uniform regulation and supervision across its divisions.
• Enforcement actions should be more frequent, including criminal prosecutions.
• The CIS framework should be strengthened in terms of disclosure, valuation, and accounting standards.
• Capital and reporting requirements for FSPs should be enhanced.
• The FSB's independence should be strengthened, particularly by reducing ministerial influence.
• Conflicts of interest between commercial and self-regulatory functions of the JSE and Strate should be managed effectively.

Conclusion

While South Africa has a robust legal and regulatory framework, there are opportunities for improvement in supervisory consistency, enforcement effectiveness, and regulatory independence. The twin peaks model is expected to address some of the structural challenges, but implementation and coordination remain key areas for attention.