2011年-WTO世界贸易组织_Natural_Resources_and_Non-Cooperative_Trade_Policy_29页_190kb
报告摘要
Summary of "Natural Resources and Non-Cooperative Trade Policy"
Core Content
This working paper by Joelle Latina, Roberta Piermartini, and Michele Ruta explores the trade policy implications of export taxes and tariff escalation in the context of natural resources. It highlights how these policies can lead to inefficient trade outcomes due to a lack of multilateral cooperation, despite being individually beneficial to the implementing country.
Main Points
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Trade in Natural Resources is Inefficient:
Trade in natural resources appears to be "upside down" compared to other goods. While tariffs on natural resources are generally lower than on overall merchandise, export restrictions are more common. Additionally, tariff escalation—where tariffs increase with the stage of processing—is significant in these sectors, as raw materials face lower duties than their processed forms. -
"Beggar-Thy-Neighbor" Effects:
Export taxes and tariff escalation can be seen as beggar-thy-neighbor policies. They allow a country to alter the relative price of its exports (terms-of-trade effect) or to boost domestic processing at the expense of foreign production (production relocation effect). These policies may lead to non-cooperative trade equilibria, where all countries involved end up with lower overall welfare. -
Legal Framework of WTO:
The WTO legal framework imposes strict regulations on import duties under GATT Article II, with binding commitments and ceilings. In contrast, export taxes are loosely regulated, not covered by binding commitments, and not subject to the same procedural requirements, allowing for greater discretion. -
Negotiation History:
The issue of export taxes and tariff escalation has been part of multilateral trade negotiations since the GATT era. The Uruguay Round (1995) excluded export duties from the scope of negotiations, while the Doha Round (2001) included tariff escalation and export taxes as potential topics for reduction or elimination. The Swiss Formula was proposed as a method to reduce tariffs in a way that targets higher tariffs more significantly.
Key Information
Export Taxes
- Usage: Export taxes are more common in natural resource sectors than in other industries.
- Impact: Export taxes can act as an indirect subsidy to domestic processing industries by lowering the domestic price of raw materials relative to international prices.
- Scope: Export taxes are generally not subject to binding commitments, and only a few WTO members have bound them in their accession protocols.
- Empirical Evidence:
- Most WTO members applying export taxes do so in a narrow range of HS two-digit sectors.
- Major exporters, such as Argentina, Cameroon, and Zambia, impose export taxes on a significant portion of their natural resource exports.
- Some countries, like Mongolia and the Central African Republic, use de-escalating tax structures, where raw materials are taxed more heavily than processed forms.
Tariff Escalation
- Definition: Tariff escalation refers to the phenomenon where tariffs on processed goods are higher than on raw materials.
- Global Evidence:
- Forestry and mining products show significant tariff escalation, with average increases of 67% and 55%, respectively.
- Fuels show a decrease in tariffs with increased processing.
- Country Differences:
- In developed countries, tariff escalation is evident, with higher nominal rates on processed goods.
- In developing countries, the degree of escalation varies. Some, like India and South Africa, show higher levels of escalation, while others, such as Latin American countries, do not exhibit escalation due to uniform tariff bindings.
Non-Cooperative Trade Policy Equilibrium
- Unilateral Incentives: Countries may impose export taxes or tariff escalation to benefit their domestic industries, even if it harms trade partners.
- Retaliation Considerations: The paper acknowledges that retaliation by trading partners can offset the unilateral benefits, leading to a non-cooperative equilibrium.
- Welfare Impact: The combination of export taxes and tariff escalation leads to inefficient trade restrictions, reducing overall welfare in the natural resource and processed goods sectors.
Conclusion
The paper concludes that tariff escalation and export taxes are often used as non-cooperative trade policies that can distort international trade. While they may provide short-term benefits to the implementing country, they tend to reduce the efficiency of global trade and lead to welfare losses for all participants. The paper emphasizes the need for multilateral cooperation to address these issues, particularly in the context of the WTO, where the legal framework currently allows for greater flexibility in export tax policies than in import tariffs.
Key Tables and Data
| Country | Natural Resources | Fish | Mining Products | Forestry | Fuels |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 100.00 | 11.18 | 31.93 | 3.85 | 53.03 |
| Cameroon and Gabon | 100.00 | 0.19 | 4.41 | 11.72 | 83.67 |
| Gambia | 100.00 | 92.42 | 2.59 | 4.98 | - |
| Central African Republic | 99.90 | - | 75.06 | 24.84 | - |
| Lesotho | 99.30 | - | 99.30 | - | - |
| Solomon Islands | 98.73 | 15.78 | 1.28 | 81.68 | - |
| China | 55.46 | 3.68 | 36.32 | - | 15.46 |
Tariff Escalation by Sector
| Sector | World Tariff Increase (Percentage Points) | Developed Countries Increase (Percentage Points) |
|---|---|---|
| Forestry | 4.12 | 1.33 |
| Fuels | -1.09 | 1.20 |
| Mining | 5.51 | 1.58 |
References and Notes
- Legal Basis: Export taxes are subject to the MFN principle, but not to binding commitments. Import duties are strictly regulated under GATT Article II.
- Negotiation Context: The Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001) included tariff escalation and export taxes as potential areas for negotiation.
- Swiss Formula: A proposed method to reduce tariffs, with different versions for developed and developing countries. It is expected to apply to ~40 WTO members, covering ~90% of global trade in goods.
Keywords
- Natural Resources
- Export Taxes
- Tariff Escalation
- Prisoner's Dilemma
- WTO
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