2008年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Application_of_Structural_Conditionality_14页_273kb

International Monetary Fund - Application of Structural Conditionality - 2008 Annual Report Summary

I. Introduction

• This report provides an update on the application of structural conditionality in Fund-supported programs using objective indicators.
• It is part of the Management Implementation Plan (MIP), responding to the IEO evaluation of structural conditionality.
• The report covers Fund arrangements approved from 1995 to 2007, with reviews up to April 30, 2008, extending the dataset by three years.
• It also examines the experience with Policy Support Instruments (PSIs), introduced in October 2005, which were not included in the IEO evaluation.
• Key findings from the IEO report remain valid, but the data does not yet reflect the full impact of the IEO evaluation on conditionality design.
• The average number of structural conditions per program year remains at about 17.
• Structural conditionality in PSIs has followed a similar pattern as in PRGF arrangements.
• The report does not analyze qualitative aspects like criticality or parsimony, which will be addressed in the next review.
• The next review will also assess the impact of upcoming revisions to the Operational Guidance Note on Conditionality.

II. Experience with Conditionality in GRA and PRGF Arrangements

A. Numbers of Conditions

• The number of GRA- and PRGF-supported programs approved in 2005–07 decreased compared to the previous three-year period (from 53 to 32 arrangements).
• GRA arrangements declined sharply, from 26 in 2002–04 to 10 in 2005–07.
• The average number of structural conditions per program year remained unchanged at about 17 for both GRA and PRGF arrangements during 2005–07.
• For GRA arrangements, the average was about 20 per program year since the start of the streamlining initiative in 2000.
• For PRGF arrangements, the average increased slightly from 13.5 to 15 per program year during 2005–07, though it had previously declined from about 19 conditions per program year before the streamlining initiative.

B. Coverage and Implementation of Structural Conditionality

• Coverage: There has been continuous progress in focusing structural conditionality on core and shared areas of Fund expertise and fewer sectors.
• Institutional Classification:
  • Core areas of Fund expertise (fiscal, monetary, exchange rate, and external sector policies) have become a larger share of structural conditions.
  • For GRA arrangements, core reform areas comprised 43% of total structural conditions in 2005–07, compared to 37% in 2002–04 and 30% before the 2002 Guidelines.
  • For PRGF arrangements, the share of core areas increased to 57%, a rise of 11 percentage points from the previous period and 20 points from 1995–2001.
  • Shared reform areas with the World Bank were about 35% in GRA arrangements since 2002, compared to 30% before the Guidelines. For PRGF arrangements, the share of shared areas declined by 7 percentage points to 21% in 2005–07.
• Economic Classification:
  • A substantial shift occurred in conditionality toward policies addressing economic and financial vulnerabilities.
  • In GRA arrangements, economic management policies constituted 38% of total conditionality in 2005–07.
  • In PRGF arrangements, economic management policies made up 52% of total conditionality.
  • Economic flexibility (e.g., trade reforms) and public sector efficiency also increased, while private sector efficiency conditions declined.
  • Vulnerability-related conditions remained about a third of total conditionality across both GRA and PRGF arrangements.

Program Implementation

• The implementation index increased from 1.3 in 2004–06 to 1.6 in 2005–07.
• The waiver rate for structural performance criteria declined from 40% in 2002–04 to 7% in 2005–07.
• The decline in the waiver rate is attributed to improved implementation, though the smaller number of programs and fewer reviews in recent years may temporarily bias the rate.

III. Experience with Conditionality in Policy Support Instruments (PSIs)

• Introduction: PSIs were introduced in October 2005 and have been used by six members in seven cases.
• Structural Conditionality:
  • PSIs averaged about 12 structural conditions per program year, compared to 15 in PRGF arrangements.
  • Structural benchmarks made up about 7–8 out of 12 conditions, while prior actions were used infrequently.
  • Structural performance criteria were used similarly in both PSIs and PRGF arrangements.
• Economic and Institutional Classification:
  • The primary focus of conditionality in PSIs was on economic management, though less than in PRGF arrangements, possibly due to more stable economic conditions of PSI members.
  • PSIs also focused on economic vulnerabilities and public and private sector efficiency.
  • Institutional classification showed that core and shared reform areas constituted about 70% of total structural conditionality.
• Program Implementation:
  • Implementation was strong in PSIs, with an implementation index of 1.8 in 2005–07.
  • The waiver rate for structural performance criteria was zero in 2007.

Key Points and Limitations

• The normalized number of conditions is reported against the year of program approval, which may lead to overestimation for ongoing programs.
• The decline in new Fund arrangements in recent years affects the average number of conditions.
• Country-specific factors may influence the number of conditions in individual programs, but the overall average could be affected by small sample sizes.
• The 2008 revisions to the Operational Guidance Note on Conditionality emphasize applying principles of parsimony and criticality to structural benchmarks.