2013年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Belgium_Technical_Note_on_Crisis_Management_and_Bank_Resolution_Framework_37页_671kb

Belgium: Technical Note on Crisis Management and Bank Resolution Framework Summary

Core Content

This document is a technical note from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the crisis management and bank resolution framework in Belgium, prepared as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Update in 2013. It outlines key findings and recommendations based on the analysis of legal and policy documents, as well as discussions with Belgian authorities and private sector representatives.

Main Findings and Recommendations

1. Institutional Arrangements

• National Bank of Belgium (NBB) has a clear financial stability mandate under the Organic Law, but its role as the resolution authority is not explicitly defined.
• The NBB has coordinating responsibilities in crisis management and can act as a resolution authority in collaboration with the Federal Government.
• FSMA (Financial Services and Markets Authority) lacks an explicit financial stability mandate but has some powers to support stability, such as suspending share trading during market disruptions and imposing penalties for false information.
• Coordination between the NBB and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) is hindered by confidentiality constraints, which prevent timely information sharing.

2. Crisis Preparation

• Crisis management simulations were conducted before the financial crisis and provided valuable insights.
• These simulations tested the crisis management procedures, information exchange, decision-making processes, and communication strategies.
• The note recommends conducting regular simulations to test the coordination arrangements and tools introduced post-crisis.

3. Crisis Management Tools

• The NBB is working on a domestic framework for Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) for Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIBs).
• The development of RRPs should be extended to all Belgian firms of systemic importance, including financial market infrastructures (FMIs) and insurance companies.
• Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) should be redesigned to include a segregated fund, financed by ex ante industry contributions, and with a recalibrated target size.
• The DGS should be allowed to contribute funding to resolution actions, up to the amount it would have distributed in case of a deposit payout.
• Shares issued by cooperative corporations should be excluded from coverage.

4. Orderly and Effective Resolution

• The NBB has introduced procedures for transferring assets and liabilities of systemically important firms, subject to ex ante judicial review.
• The procedural aspects of these tools should be revised to reduce uncertainty and mitigate stability risks.
• The scope of these powers should be broadened to include holding companies and non-systemic institutions.
• The NBB should be empowered to directly initiate resolution procedures before court.

5. Bank Liquidation and Insolvency

• Belgian law currently applies general bankruptcy proceedings to banks, which are not suitable for the specific needs of credit institutions.
• A rapid transfer of critical functions (e.g., payment services, trade finance) to a third party should be allowed, under the oversight of the resolution authority.
• The NBB should have the power to directly initiate such procedures.

6. Moral Hazard Safeguards

• The NBB provides Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to solvent but temporarily illiquid firms, backed by adequate collateral.
• Powers to grant state guarantees have been introduced during the crisis and used to support systemically important firms.
• Going forward, new guarantees should be granted with caution, and losses should be allocated to the private sector, such as through shareholder dilution.

7. Cross-Border Coordination

• Belgium has a significant level of foreign ownership in its financial system, making cross-border coordination essential.
• The 2008 EU multilateral MOU provides a formal framework for cross-border stability, but its implementation has been delayed in many member states.
• Belgium has initiated meetings for Cross-Border Stability Groups (CBSGs) for G-SIFIs (Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions) like KBC and Dexia.
• Formalizing Voluntary Specific Cooperation Agreements (VSCAs) and establishing a Cross-Institutional Coordination Group is recommended to improve coordination and policy alignment.

Key Viewpoints

• The crisis revealed weaknesses in Belgium’s existing crisis management and resolution framework, which have been partially addressed through new legislation.
• The NBB should be granted an explicit mandate as the resolution authority.
• Crisis simulations and RRPs are critical for improving preparedness and reducing the need for public support.
• Transparency and efficiency in the DGS and resolution process are necessary to prevent moral hazard and ensure cost-effective resolution.
• International best practices should be integrated into the domestic framework, including the FSB's Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes.

Conclusion

The document emphasizes the need for enhancing institutional coordination, formalizing resolution powers, improving the DGS, and implementing RRPs for all systemically important firms. It also highlights the importance of cross-border cooperation and resolvability assessments to ensure the stability and resilience of Belgium’s financial system.