战略与国际研究中心-Summary-for-the-Conference-on-US_5页_110kb

Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics (2006)

Core Content

The 2006 Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics was a significant "track 1.5" dialogue held in Beijing, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the RAND Corporation, and the China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies (CFISS). It was the third in a series of bilateral meetings initiated in 2000, focusing on strategic stability, nuclear strategy, no-first-use (NFU) policies, missile defense, and nonproliferation. The conference aimed to foster an unofficial yet authoritative channel for discussing sensitive nuclear issues in the U.S.-China relationship.

Main Participants

• U.S. Delegation: Comprised of former and current government officials and analysts with expertise in U.S. and Chinese nuclear policy. Key figures included Admiral Dennis Blair and Admiral Richard Mies, former commanders of U.S. Pacific and Strategic Commands. Participants were drawn from multiple agencies and institutions, including the State Department, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the Department of Energy.
• Chinese Delegation: Led by Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Li Jijun, with participants from the PLA, the Academy of Military Sciences, the General Staff Department, the Second Artillery, the Foreign Ministry, and academic institutions like the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics and Qinghua University. Notably, a Second Artillery officer participated for the first time, offering unsolicited comments.

Key Discussion Topics

1. Perception of Nuclear Security Environments:

   • Both nations acknowledged reduced risks of major nuclear conflict post-Cold War but noted rising proliferation concerns.
   • China views its nuclear environment as tense, complex, and uncertain, particularly due to U.S. defense policies like the "New Triad" and concerns over Japan and India's nuclear capabilities.

2. Nuclear Modernization:

   • The U.S. aims to reduce the value of nuclear weapons and enhance strategic defense and non-nuclear strike capabilities through the "New Triad."
   • China seeks to improve the survivability and penetration capability of its nuclear forces, fearing U.S. efforts to neutralize its deterrent.

3. Nuclear Doctrines:

   • China's doctrine emphasizes assured retaliation, not destruction, and is aimed at deterring nuclear aggression and coercion.
   • The U.S. doctrine is perceived by Chinese experts as one that favors first use, especially with the development of smaller nuclear warheads.

4. Role in a Taiwan Conflict:

   • Chinese strategists believe the burden of nuclear escalation would fall on the U.S., not China.
   • They do not see a need to use nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression, as they could prevail through prolonged conflict.
   • Ambiguity was maintained regarding nuclear retaliation in response to attacks on Chinese nuclear assets.

5. Strategic Competition and Cooperation:

   • Concerns were raised that U.S. nuclear modernization efforts could pressure China to expand its arsenal.
   • A bilateral no-first-use (NFU) agreement was suggested to manage mutual concerns, particularly in the context of a potential Taiwan conflict.

6. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Nonproliferation:

   • Both sides expressed concern over WMD proliferation and praised the progress in bilateral nonproliferation cooperation.
   • China called for continued collaboration, emphasizing the need to address challenges like the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement and Japan's latent nuclear capabilities.

Key Findings

• China's Nuclear Strategy:

  • Chinese strategists have increasingly engaged in internal discussions on nuclear doctrine and strategy, indicating a growing focus on nuclear issues.
  • China's modernization is driven by the desire to maintain a credible deterrent against U.S. nuclear transformation goals.
  • The concept of counter-deterrence is central to Chinese nuclear thinking, emphasizing resistance to nuclear coercion.

• NFU Policy Debate:

  • An internal debate exists in China about whether to eliminate or conditionalize its NFU policy, but it is not seen as a major doctrinal shift.
  • Chinese policymakers view the U.S. lack of a NFU pledge as a threat to their deterrent posture and a lowering of the nuclear threshold.

• Nonproliferation and Cooperation:

  • Both nations recognize the need for improved nonproliferation cooperation and have made progress in this area.
  • China expressed concern over U.S. nuclear expansion and the U.S.-India agreement, which could undermine global nonproliferation norms.
  • Japan's potential nuclear development was identified as a concern and an area for potential U.S.-Chinese collaboration.

Conclusion

The conference underscored the evolving nature of U.S.-China nuclear relations, marked by increased dialogue and a willingness to engage on sensitive issues. While both sides share concerns about proliferation, they diverge significantly in their nuclear doctrines and modernization goals. China's focus remains on maintaining a credible, sufficient, and effective deterrent, while the U.S. pursues a more flexible, defensive approach. The dialogue also highlighted the potential for cooperation on nonproliferation and the importance of managing mutual strategic concerns to prevent escalation.