战略与国际研究中心-2008-US_7页_160kb

Conference on “U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dynamics” Summary

Introduction

On June 9–10, 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), the RAND Corporation, and the China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies (CFISS) co-hosted a "track 1.5" conference in Beijing to examine strategic nuclear dynamics in the U.S.-China relationship. The conference was jointly funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the U.S. Department of State. It aimed to foster understanding and reduce misperceptions regarding nuclear strategy, policy, and strategic stability between the two nations.

Key Findings

1. Perceptions of the Security Environment

• Nuclear Terrorism: Both sides acknowledged the growing threat of nuclear terrorism, though the U.S. views it as a vital national interest, while China sees it as one of many important concerns. There was a call for increased bilateral cooperation and joint counter-terror exercises.
• Asia's Nuclear Future: China and the U.S. share a view that Asia is becoming a major arena of international nuclear politics. Both express concerns about nuclear proliferation in the region, particularly by Japan and in South Asia, but China shows little interest in formal participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
• U.S. Extended Deterrence to Japan: China is cautiously accepting of this, though it expresses concern about the potential deployment of missile defense systems to Taiwan.
• Arms Control and Nonproliferation: China is open to new initiatives but has not engaged in systematic analysis of U.S.-Russia arms control developments. It emphasizes maintaining a small, secure, and survivable nuclear arsenal and supports the CTBT, FMCT, and a ban on weaponizing outer space. It also shows interest in the U.S. debate on nuclear abolition, though it is skeptical about the implications of a nuclear-free world with U.S. conventional dominance.

2. Next Steps in U.S. and Chinese Nuclear Policy and Strategy

• China's Nuclear Policy: China maintains a limited nuclear retaliatory capability, a no-first-use policy, and negative security assurances. It exercises restraint in nuclear development and will not deploy nuclear weapons on foreign territories or participate in a nuclear arms race.
• U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): The 2001 NPR was perceived by Chinese experts as dangerous and destabilizing, particularly due to its emphasis on nuclear use in conflict and missile defense. China believes that U.S. policies undermine strategic stability.
• Transparency: While China is open to increased transparency in conventional forces and military budgets, it resists transparency on nuclear capabilities, citing the need to maintain a credible deterrent against potential first-strike attacks. It argues that non-transparency strengthens deterrence and strategic stability.

3. The Requirements of Strategic Stability

• U.S. Concerns: The U.S. believes that China's modernization program and lack of transparency are eroding strategic stability. It urges China to adopt a no-first-use posture or engage in a bilateral no-first-use agreement.
• Chinese Concerns: China views U.S. military predominance and the development of strategic military tools (e.g., missile defense, ISR, and long-range conventional strike capabilities) as the primary sources of instability. It argues that these capabilities threaten its ability to maintain a secure second-strike capacity.
• Mutual Misperceptions: Both sides expressed concerns about misunderstandings of each other's nuclear policies and intentions. A senior PLA expert called for high-level strategic dialogue to address these misperceptions.
• Stalemate in Strategic Stability: The discussion revealed a stalemate in thinking about strategic stability, with each side blaming the other. Despite this, there was openness to exploring ways to promote stability that align with shared political objectives.

Final Observation

The conference demonstrated a continued willingness by Chinese officials, scientists, and scholars to engage in substantive discussions with their U.S. counterparts on nuclear weapons and strategic stability. The dialogue provided a unique platform for exchanging insights and building trust, especially as formal U.S.-China defense dialogues on nuclear issues had just begun in spring 2008. The discussions highlighted both areas of convergence and divergence, with a strong emphasis on reducing misperceptions and improving strategic communication.