2011年-世界发展银行全球_Using_PES_to_Implement_REDD_22页_1mb

Summary of PES Learning Paper 2011-1: Using PES to Implement REDD

Core Content

This paper explores the potential of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) as a tool for implementing the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) program. It is authored by Stefano Pagiola, a Senior Environmental Economist at the World Bank's Latin America and Caribbean Sustainable Development Department.

Main Points

1. Introduction to REDD and PES

• Deforestation contributes about 15% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
• REDD has the potential to significantly reduce emissions at lower costs than other mitigation options.
• Successful REDD implementation requires effective strategies to reduce deforestation and forest degradation.
• PES is a market-based approach to conservation financing, where beneficiaries pay service providers for environmental services.
• PES is one of the instruments that countries might use to implement REDD, by compensating landholders for maintaining forest cover.

2. Experience with PES in Latin America

• Latin America has a substantial number of PES programs, with over 80 active programs in 18 countries.
• Two main types of PES programs:
  • Government-financed programs: Examples include Costa Rica's PSA, Mexico's PSAB, and Ecuador's Socio Bosque.
  • User-financed programs: Most are watershed-scale and funded by water users, hydroelectric producers, or other entities.
• National PES programs typically cover large areas (e.g., 300,000 ha in Costa Rica, 1.9 million ha in Mexico).
• Sub-national PES programs may also be part of REDD strategies, but they face additional challenges like leakage.

3. Applicability of PES in REDD

3.1 PES and Externalities

• PES is designed to address situations where land uses generate positive externalities.
• In cases where deforestation is driven by factors other than externalities (e.g., insecure tenure), PES may not be effective.

3.2 Insecure Tenure

• Insecure tenure is a major cause of deforestation and degradation.
• PES requires secure land tenure to be effective, as it is difficult to identify and compensate effective managers without clear rights.
• Insecure tenure can lead to deforestation even in areas where forest returns are higher than agricultural returns.

3.3 Types of Land

• Forest-agriculture mosaic-lands: Tenure is well-defined, and PES is generally applicable.
• Frontier and disputed areas: Tenure is poorly defined, and deforestation is active; PES may be difficult to apply.
• Areas beyond the agricultural frontier: Tenure may be weak, but deforestation threats are low; PES is largely unnecessary.

3.4 Other Instruments

• PES is not always the best solution. Other instruments, such as improving property rights, increasing agricultural productivity, or addressing market imperfections, may be more effective in certain contexts.
• In areas where RA > RF (agricultural returns exceed forest returns), clarifying property rights could be more beneficial than PES.

4. Effectiveness and Efficiency of PES

4.1 Theoretical Expectations

• Increasing returns to forests should reduce deforestation or promote forest regeneration.
• PES is expected to be effective in areas where landholders would otherwise deforest without compensation.

4.2 Empirical Evidence

• In Costa Rica, the PSA program has been associated with increased forest cover, but results are mixed.
• Some studies suggest that the program has had a minimal impact on deforestation during 1997-1999.
• The effectiveness of PES varies depending on the region, property type, and the level of deforestation risk.
• In Mexico, the PSAB program showed a small positive effect on reducing deforestation, with heterogeneity across regions.

4.3 Additionality and Targeting

• PES programs must be targeted to ensure additionality (i.e., that deforestation would not have occurred without the program).
• Blanket, untargeted programs are likely to be ineffective, as they may not reach landholders who are most likely to deforest.
• The ratio of avoided deforestation to enrolled areas is lowest in low-risk areas and highest in high-risk areas.

Key Information

• PES and REDD: PES can be used to implement REDD by compensating landholders for maintaining forest cover.
• Challenges: Insecure land tenure is a major barrier to PES effectiveness.
• Effectiveness: Evidence on PES effectiveness is mixed, with some success in certain regions and contexts.
• Targeting: PES programs must be carefully targeted to ensure they have an impact on reducing deforestation.
• Alternative Instruments: Other approaches to reducing deforestation, such as improving property rights and agricultural intensification, may be more effective in some cases.

Conclusion

PES has potential as a tool for REDD implementation, but its effectiveness depends on the context, particularly the level of land tenure security and the type of land being targeted. While PES can help reduce deforestation in certain areas, it is not a universal solution and must be complemented by other instruments. The paper emphasizes the need for careful design and targeting of PES programs to ensure they contribute to both environmental and social outcomes.