2013年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_Simulation_Results_on_the_Impact_of_Changes_in_the_Main_EU_Policy_Tools_on_Farm_Investment_Behaviour_17页_275kb
报告摘要
Summary of "Simulation Results on the Impact of Changes in the Main EU Policy Tools on Farm Investment Behaviour"
Core Content
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the investment demand behavior of specialised arable crop farms in selected EU Member States, focusing on the impact of changes in Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) support tools, specifically Direct Payments (DPs), on investment in farm buildings (FB) and machinery and equipment (ME). The study uses FADN data and empirical models to estimate the elasticity of investment levels to different types of subsidies and simulates the expected changes in investment under various CAP reform scenarios.
Main Policy Scenarios
The CAP reform scenarios considered are:
- EU Flat Rate: A uniform payment per hectare of potential eligible area (PEA) across the EU.
- Min 80%: A policy that aims to equalise the average level of DPs in Member States to at least 80% of the EU average.
- Min 90% and Objective Criteria: A policy where DPs reach 90% of the EU average, with additional environmental and economic criteria for the remaining 10%.
- Integration: Reduces the gap between Member States and the EU average by one-third over the Multi-Annual Financial Framework 2014-2020.
- Refocus: Scraps DPs and doubles Pillar-II funds, though this scenario was not simulated due to lack of data on Pillar-II measures.
Empirical Model and Elasticity Calculations
The empirical model used to estimate the relationship between CAP support and investment behavior is based on the methodological approach outlined by Hansen (1999). The model calculates regime-specific elasticities using the following formula:
$$
\xi_{i,j}^{sub} = \beta^{sub} * \frac{\overline{sub_{t,J}}}{\overline{inv_{t,J}}}
$$
Where:
- $\beta^{sub}$ is the beta coefficient from the investment demand equations.
- $\overline{sub_{t,J}}$ and $\overline{inv_{t,J}}$ are the yearly and regime-specific average values of subsidies and net investment levels, respectively.
The study identifies three regimes:
- Disinvestment (Dis): Negative investment behavior.
- Zero Investment (ZInv): No investment.
- Investment (Inv): Positive investment behavior.
Key Findings
Elasticities and Investment Behavior
- Germany (DEU):
- A statistically significant elastic relationship exists between coupled subsidies and investment in FB.
- Decoupled subsidies also show an elastic relationship with investment in FB and ME.
- Italy (ITA):
- A statistically significant elastic relationship exists between coupled subsidies and investment in FB.
- Decoupled subsidies show an inelastic relationship with investment in ME.
- Hungary (HUN):
- Investment in FB is elastic to decoupled subsidies.
- Changes in coupled payments result in less than proportional changes in investment for both FB and ME.
- France (FR):
- Coupled payments lead to less than proportional changes in the demand for both FB and ME.
- Decoupled subsidies are elastic for ME, but not for FB.
- United Kingdom (UK):
- Both coupled and decoupled subsidies influence investment in FB and ME in an elastic manner.
Simulated Changes in Investment Levels
The paper simulates the percentage changes in average net investment levels under different CAP reform scenarios. The results suggest that:
- France and Italy show smaller negative or larger positive changes in investment in ME despite reductions in DPs.
- Germany experiences a larger negative change in investment in both FB and ME.
- Hungary shows a less pronounced impact on investment in ME.
- United Kingdom sees a more mixed response, with some scenarios leading to increases and others to decreases in investment levels.
Data and Methodology
The analysis is based on FADN data collected from EU Member States, which provides economic information on agricultural holdings. The data covers the period 2001–2008 and is used to classify farms into investment regimes. The study also accounts for credit constraints and differences in asset prices, as well as the impact of real options and asset fixity.
Conclusions
The findings indicate that changes in the level of support through DPs significantly affect farm investment behavior. The simulation results largely align with the expectation that reductions in DPs will lead to a decline in investment, with the exception of France and Italy, where investment in ME shows a less negative or even positive response to DPs cuts. This suggests that the impact of CAP reforms on investment is not uniform across all EU Member States and asset classes, and that decoupled and coupled payments have different effects on investment behavior.
Key Tables
- Table 1: Percentage change in DPs under different CAP Policy Reform Scenarios.
- Table 2: Estimated beta and average values of the investment levels and coupled support.
- Table 3: Estimated betas and average values of the investment levels and CAP support.
- Table 4: Farm classification into estimated regimes 2001–2004.
- Table 5: Farm classification under estimated regimes 2005–2008.
Summary of Simulation Results
| Country | Asset Class | Change in DPs | Simulated Impact on Investment |
|---|---|---|---|
| France (FR) | FB | -12% | Less negative or more positive |
| France (FR) | ME | -13% | Larger negative or smaller positive |
| Germany (DEU) | FB | -13% | Larger negative |
| Germany (DEU) | ME | -16% | Larger negative |
| Hungary (HUN) | FB | -8% | Less negative |
| Hungary (HUN) | ME | -5% | Less negative |
| Italy (ITA) | FB | -22% | Less negative |
| Italy (ITA) | ME | -22% | Less negative |
| UK | FB | -10% | Mixed |
| UK | ME | -5% | Mixed |
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