斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Policy-impact-assessment-report-on-the-NATO-Building-Integrity-programme_36页_1mb

NATO Building Integrity Programme Policy Impact Assessment Report Summary (2018)

Core Content

The NATO Building Integrity (BI) Programme is a defence capacity-building initiative aimed at reducing corruption and enhancing good governance in the defence and security sectors of NATO member states and partner countries. It was launched in 2007 and has undergone three phases, with the third phase (2015–2018) seeing 19 states complete the Self-Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ) and Peer Review Process (PRP). This report, conducted by SIPRI, evaluates the programme's impact since the 2014 assessment, based on survey responses from state representatives and semi-structured interviews with implementing partners and civil society experts.

Main Findings

• The BI Programme is perceived as highly beneficial by most participating states.

• Positive changes were reported across various areas, including:

  • Increased senior management engagement with BI tools.
  • Enhanced awareness of corruption risks, ethics, and integrity.
  • Identification of additional education and training needs.
  • Development of action plans and monitoring mechanisms.
  • Revisions to national legislation and policies.
  • Establishment of permanent structures to implement and promote good practices.
  • New procedures and systems in areas such as procurement, whistleblowing, and ethical guidelines.
  • Improvements in relations between the MOD and civil society, including NGOs, media, and academia.

• The overall impact is greater than that observed in the 2014 assessment, indicating a positive trajectory of the programme.

Challenges Identified

• Sustaining reform momentum remains a challenge for many states.
• Lack of transparency in some participating states, as they have not published peer review reports and action plans.
• Political instrumentalization of BI participation by some governments.
• Limited mainstreaming of defence integrity in all NATO member states and their armed forces.

Methodological Limitations

The report acknowledges several limitations in assessing impact:

1. Attribution Challenges

• Many integrity reforms may be the result of parallel initiatives or internal efforts, not solely the BI Programme.
• Without independent indicators, it is difficult to isolate the impact of BI from other anti-corruption efforts.

2. Self-Selection Bias

• Participation in BI is voluntary, meaning that states more willing to reform are more likely to engage.
• This creates a self-selection bias, as non-participating states are not included in the analysis.
• A control group would improve the accuracy of impact assessment.

3. Intrinsic Bias

• Respondents, particularly defence officials, may have personal vested interests in the outcomes.
• This can lead to overestimation of the programme’s impact.
• Including diverse perspectives, such as those from civil society and NGOs, helps mitigate this bias.

Recommendations

To further strengthen the NATO BI Programme, the report recommends:

1. Refining the SAQ and PRP and developing new tools for impact assessment.
2. Establishing expert networks to provide more objective assessments and support.
3. Mainstreaming building integrity across all NATO member states and armed forces.
4. Improving communication with stakeholders, including civil society and the media.
5. Implementing regular monitoring and evaluation to ensure sustained progress and accountability.

Key Tools and Activities

• SAQ: A diagnostic tool used to assess current practices and procedures in the defence and security sector.
• PRP: A peer review process that involves consultations with experts and government representatives to identify best practices and recommend improvements.
• BI Education and Training Plan: Adopted in 2012 to integrate integrity into defence education and training.
• Building Integrity Policy: Endorsed in 2016 at the Warsaw Summit, emphasizing the importance of integrity in defence.

Case Examples of Impact

• Norway: Developed a Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector and emphasized ethical recruitment and training.
• United Kingdom: Established a Fraud Defence Training and Awareness Team.
• Bosnia and Herzegovina: Created a MOD Policy on Building Integrity, a Committee and Expert Group, and an Integrity Plan.
• Republic of Moldova: Incorporated BI results into a National Anti-corruption Strategy and cooperation documents.
• Ukraine: Developed a code of conduct for border management and introduced professional ethics training.
• Georgia: Integrated integrity into human resources policy and introduced training curricula.
• Hungary: Introduced new courses and training methodologies on ethics and integrity.
• Latvia: Proposed legislation to limit access to sensitive information.
• Montenegro: Amended a proposed Law on the Armed Forces based on BI feedback, focusing on recruitment, promotion, and conflict of interest.

Conclusion

The NATO BI Programme has made significant strides in promoting anti-corruption and good governance in the defence and security sectors. While the programme is viewed as beneficial, challenges such as maintaining reform momentum, transparency, and mainstreaming remain. The report emphasizes the need for more rigorous methodologies, diverse stakeholder input, and systematic monitoring to enhance the programme's effectiveness and impact assessment.