国际事务研究院-意大利的“一带一路”倡议：热那亚和的里雅斯特的港口（英文）-2021.5-20页_1mb

The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Trieste Summary

Core Content

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, has been a focal point of international debate, particularly in Europe and the United States, due to concerns about Chinese influence and strategic control over key infrastructure. Italy's participation in the BRI, especially through its ports of Genoa and Trieste, has raised similar concerns, but these have not materialized due to legal constraints and transparency measures.

Main Points and Concerns

• BRI Overview: The BRI is a global infrastructure and connectivity project aimed at enhancing trade routes and economic ties between China and other countries. It has been interpreted in various ways, including as a global development plan, a geostrategic move, and a means to manage domestic overproduction.

• Concerns Raised:

  • Lack of Clarity: The BRI's objectives are not clearly defined, leading to speculation and distrust.
  • Chinese Dominance: Most BRI projects are led by Chinese enterprises and banks, with limited involvement from local or international partners.
  • Debt Trap Allegations: There are claims that China compels countries to cede assets due to large loans, though this has only been observed in a few developing economies.
  • Strategic Control: Concerns that China seeks to control trade routes and infrastructure through the BRI.

• Legal and Regulatory Constraints: Italy and the EU have legal frameworks that limit foreign ownership of critical infrastructure. Public tenders are mandatory for port investments, and the Italian government can block foreign acquisitions using its "Golden Power."

Key Chinese Companies in the Italian Port Sector

• COSCO (China Ocean Shipping Company): A major state-owned enterprise involved in shipping and logistics. It acquired the Port of Piraeus in Greece and has been collaborating with the Port of Trieste for years.

• CCCC (China Communications Construction Company): A key infrastructure contractor involved in the BRI. It was the partner for the ports of Genoa and Trieste in the 2019 MoU, but its involvement has been limited and non-conclusive.

• CMG (China Merchants Group): A state-owned enterprise based in Hong Kong, active in ports and logistics. It has invested in the Logistic Intermodal Platform in Trieste.

The Ports of Genoa and Trieste

• Genoa (WLSPA): A historically significant port in the Mediterranean. It is part of the Western Ligurian Sea Port Authority, which includes Savona, Pra', and Vado Ligure. The port has been developing its infrastructure, including a new breakwater dam.

• Trieste (EASPA): A strategic port in the Adriatic, with a free port status since 1947. It has been a key hub for trade with Central and Eastern Europe. The port is also part of the Trihub project, which aims to improve rail connections.

Pre-2019 Collaborations

• Genoa: Already had collaborations with COSCO and Qingdao Port Group, including the construction of a new terminal in Vado Ligure.

• Trieste: Engaged in discussions with CMG regarding a logistics platform and had a planned collaboration with CCCC under the Trihub project.

The 2019 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)

• The MoU between Italy and China, signed in March 2019, included agreements with CCCC for Genoa and Trieste.
• The MoU was framed as a general framework for cooperation in transport, logistics, and infrastructure.
• It emphasized transparency, non-discrimination, and alignment with existing EU and Italian legal frameworks.
• The agreements were not specific projects but rather a starting point for future collaboration.

Post-2019 Developments

• Genoa: CCCC participated in a public tender for a new breakwater dam but was not selected. There has been no significant progress on the MoU.
• Trieste: A more specific MoU was signed with CCCC in November 2019, but it has not led to substantial investment. Instead, the port has seen a major investment from HHLA (a German company) in the Logistic Intermodal Platform.
• Impact of the MoU: Despite initial concerns, the MoU has had limited impact on the ports of Genoa and Trieste, and has not led to significant Chinese control or strategic advantages.

Conclusion

While the BRI and the 2019 MoU with China have raised concerns about foreign influence and strategic control, the legal and regulatory environment in Italy has prevented these concerns from materializing. The MoU has not resulted in significant Chinese investment or control over the ports, and other European partners have taken a more active role in the development of these critical infrastructure projects.