2012年-世界发展银行全球_Review_of_State-Owned_Banks_in_Belarus_26页_469kb

报告摘要

Summary of the Review of State-Owned Banks in Belarus

Core Content

This technical note reviews the role and challenges of state-owned banks in Belarus, including the Belarusbank, Belagroprombank, Belinvestbank, and Paritetbank, as well as the newly established Development Bank of Belarus (DBB). The analysis focuses on the structure, governance, and policy implications of these banks, particularly in relation to government programs and the broader financial sector.

Main Points

Dominance of State-Owned Banks

State-owned banks account for 65% of total banking system assets, 84% of total capital, and two-thirds of total deposits as of the end of 2011.
They provide 60% of total credit in the country.
Their dominance is especially pronounced in sectors targeted by government programs, such as agriculture, housing, and manufacturing.

Lending under Government Programs (LGP)

LGP is a well-established practice in Belarus, with over 60% of total bank lending being LGP.
These programs are fully guaranteed by the central and local governments, making them highly attractive to public banks.
The outstanding guarantees in end-2011 amounted to BYR 37.3 trillion, representing 50% of total LGP.
Belagroprombank holds the largest share of outstanding guarantees, followed by Belarusbank.
LGP has imposed significant challenges, including:
- Liquidity pressures
- Crowding out of private banks
- Macro-economic instability due to excessive credit growth
- Moral hazard and fiscal costs from guarantee claims and recapitalizations
- Distorted competitive environment in the financial sector

Funding Structure

Deposits remain the main source of funding for public banks, with over 50% of their funding coming from deposits.
Government deposits and capital injections are also critical, especially for Belarusbank and Belagroprombank.
NBRB funding has decreased in all banks (except Paritetbank), as the central bank aims to discontinue non-market liquidity support.
Debt securities have become a more significant funding source, likely due to the NBRB’s purchase of securities to support public banks.

Corporate Governance and Supervision

Weaker corporate governance is a major issue, with supervisory boards dominated by government officials who also perform ownership functions.
Board members lack banking experience and independence, and are not vetted by the NBRB.
Accountability is weak due to overlapping roles between ownership and board management.
NBRB is responsible for supervising public banks and enforcing prudential standards.
A new banking law is under development to improve corporate governance and risk management standards across the sector.

The Future of Public Banks

The government plans to reduce LGP and streamline its implementation.
Privatization of smaller banks is ongoing, but progress has been limited due to the financial crisis.
Paritetbank is in the final stage of privatization.
Belarusbank and Belagroprombank are expected to remain state-owned.

Development Bank of Belarus (DBB)

Overview

The DBB was established in 2011 via a Presidential decree, following the 2010 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).
The FSAP argued that LGP had undermined competition, crowded out private lending, and distorted risk management incentives.
The DBB was intended to be the exclusive source of funding for state development programs, with its operations reflected in the state budget.

Current Policy Mandate

The DBB is expected to address multiple and conflicting objectives, including:
- Resolving bad assets of public banks
- Containing credit growth
- Ensuring self-sustainability
- Financing only viable projects on a market basis

Key Recommendations for the DBB

Narrow down the policy mandate to focus on specific market gaps.
Require cooperation with the private sector and ensure self-sustainability.
Adopt a wholesale lending model, channeling LGP funds to public and private banks.
Make LGP participation voluntary, with banks taking full credit risk.
Use partial credit guarantees at market prices to encourage riskier lending.
Empower the DBB to fund itself from the market and discontinue direct government funding.
Clarify procedures for transferring LGP portfolios from public banks to the DBB.
Place the DBB under the supervision of the NBRB.

Key Issues and Concerns

The DBB's mandate and role remain unclear.
There are unanswered questions about its regulatory framework, lending model, corporate governance, and funding structure.
These issues are critical to the sustainability of the DBB and the overall banking system.

Conclusion

The public banks are highly dependent on government funding, which has distorted the financial sector and increased fiscal costs.
The DBB is expected to take over LGP over time, but its role and structure are still under debate.
To ensure sustainability and effectiveness, the DBB needs a clear mandate, market-based operations, and independent supervision.
Corporate governance reforms are essential for all state-owned banks to improve accountability, efficiency, and independence.

Recommendations

For All State-Owned Banks

Strengthen corporate governance by appointing independent board members with banking expertise.
Limit the number of government officials in supervisory boards.
Empower the NBRB to vet all supervisory board appointments.
Set performance targets and hold supervisory and management boards accountable.