JFE-分布式账本与货币治理_15页_1mb

The paper provides an economic analysis of distributed ledger technology (DLT) validation mechanisms, focusing on ensuring ledger integrity and efficiency. It examines how validators, who verify transactions, can be incentivized under various settings—centralized, permissioned, or permissionless—and how factors like trust, validation costs, and decentralization affect outcomes.

Key insights from the paper include the role of supermajority voting thresholds 𝜏 and validator compensation 𝑍(𝜏) to mitigate bribing incentives. When intertemporal incentives are strong (e.g., high discount factor δ), a centralized or near-centralized system with one validator may be optimal for efficiency. However, as δ decreases, the solution shifts toward greater decentralization, involving more validators and a higher threshold to ensure consensus, but with a trade-off on trade size and welfare.

The authors model this using a fictitious planner's problem, incorporating global game methods to handle strategic uncertainty, and demonstrate that competing ledgers can implement the optimal design. Overall, DLT validation balances the benefits of decentralization against coordination costs, with important implications for monetary systems, including potential challenges like the scalability trilemma and the need for robust incentive structures.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Raphael Auer: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Formal analysis, Conceptualization.
Cyril Monnet: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Formal analysis, Conceptualization.
Hyun Song Shin: Writing – review & editing, Writing – original draft, Formal analysis, Conceptualization.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.