2021-10-31-莫卡特斯中心-技术平台和市场力量_什么是最佳的政策反应_（英）_54页_1mb

Summary of "Tech Platforms and Market Power: What’s the Optimal Policy Response?" by Thomas Lambert

Introduction

The paper analyzes the three primary approaches to addressing market power concerns in digital platforms: antitrust law, ex ante conduct rules, and ongoing agency oversight. It emphasizes that all three approaches have limitations, but cautions against prematurely adopting alternatives like ex ante rules or new regulators due to the complexity of digital markets.

Comparative Analysis of Approaches

1. Antitrust Law:

   • Pros: Standards-based, flexible, and avoids public choice concerns like rent-seeking and agency capture.
   • Cons: Indeterminate and slow, especially in new market structures. However, antitrust is improving as precedents develop and is still the residual regulator for digital markets.

2. Ex Ante Conduct Rules:

   • Pros: Determinate and quick in implementation.
   • Cons: High error costs due to the knowledge problem—regulators lack the information to correctly predict behavioral effects. Examples like structural separations, self-preferencing bans, and interoperability mandates often have unintended consequences.

3. Ongoing Agency Oversight:

   • Pros: Can be tailored to specific contexts and may act faster than antitrust.
   • Cons: Susceptible to political influence, rent-seeking, and agency capture due to broad discretion and continuous engagement with regulated firms.

Digital Platforms: Context and Issues

• The paper examines the legal challenges and regulatory proposals targeting dominant platforms like Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple.
• Key areas targeted by ex ante rules include data portability, interoperability, self-preferencing, and app store policies.
• Many proposed rules undermine business models that benefit consumers, such as free platforms with revenue-generating features.

Conclusion

• Market power should be addressed cautiously.
• Antitrust is optimal for digital platforms due to its adaptability and resistance to political manipulation.
• Ex ante rules and agency oversight are riskier due to high error costs and public choice concerns.
• Policymakers should wait for court outcomes and observe the results of European and UK initiatives before reconsidering antitrust.