2016年-FSB全球金融稳定委员会_Peer_Review_of_Japan_65页_858kb

Peer Review Summary of Japan

Core Content

The Peer Review of Japan, conducted by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2016, evaluates Japan's macroprudential policy framework and resolution framework for financial institutions. It is based on responses to a questionnaire by Japanese financial authorities and discussions within the FSB's Standing Committee on Standards Implementation (SCSI). The review highlights both progress made and areas needing further development to align with international standards and enhance financial stability.

Main Findings

• Macroprudential Framework: Japan has made progress in implementing reforms to strengthen its macroprudential policy framework, including the establishment of the Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability (CCFS) and the Macroprudential Policy Office. The BOJ and JFSA have improved data collection, use of market intelligence, and public communication of risk assessments. However, further work is needed to:

  • Strengthen institutional arrangements for financial stability.
  • Improve inter-agency cooperation for systemic risk assessments.
  • Broaden financial stability analysis beyond the banking sector.

• Resolution Framework: Japan has developed a cross-sectoral resolution regime under the Deposit Insurance Act (DIA), which applies to all financial institutions. This includes powers such as asset transfer, temporary bridge institutions, and loss imposition on creditors. However, challenges remain in:

  • Clarifying the choice of resolution measures.
  • Ensuring the credibility of the resolution framework.
  • Addressing the role of court involvement in resolution actions.
  • Developing sector-specific adaptations for non-bank SIFIs.
  • Ensuring the full recovery of resolution costs from the financial industry.

Key Recommendations

Macroprudential Policy Framework

1. Strengthen institutional arrangements:

   • Develop distinct processes within the BOJ and JFSA for systemic risk assessment and policy discussion at a senior level.
   • Establish a formal mandate for the CCFS, expand its membership to include relevant authorities, and define members' responsibilities.

2. Enhance inter-agency coordination:

   • Expand data sharing between the BOJ and JFSA for systemic risk analysis.
   • Foster coordinated analytical work, such as stress-testing and interconnectedness analysis, to leverage each authority's expertise.

3. Broaden financial stability analysis:

   • Expand bottom-up stress tests beyond SIBs.
   • Improve non-bank financial sector risk assessment using quantitative methods.
   • Incorporate sovereign-financial stability interlinkages into analysis, including scenarios of rising domestic bond yields.

Resolution Framework

4. Clarify resolution measures:

   • Develop transparent and formal guidance on the distinction between crisis measures and orderly resolution.
   • Elaborate on the concept of likely insolvency under Special Resolution Regime II.

5. Align temporary funding with Key Attributes:

   • Clarify public communication that private funding sources are prioritized to cover losses.
   • Ensure that resolution funding is eventually recovered from the financial industry.

6. Develop sector-specific adaptations:

   • Create resolution strategies tailored to non-bank SIFIs, based on international policy developments.
   • Amend existing resolution powers for non-bank institutions to ensure they are not contingent on policyholder cooperation.

7. Address court involvement in resolution:

   • Consider court procedures in resolution planning, especially for the transfer of systemically important assets and liabilities.
   • Explore the possibility of an administrative regime for recognizing foreign resolution actions, similar to practices in other jurisdictions.

Conclusion

The peer review highlights Japan's progress in enhancing its macroprudential and resolution frameworks, but underscores the need for further improvements to ensure alignment with international standards and to build market confidence. The recommendations aim to strengthen institutional coordination, improve transparency, and ensure that resolution measures are both effective and credible.