IMF-秘鲁_选定问题（英）-2025_18页_931kb

Summary of the IMF Report on Fiscal Decentralization in Peru

Core Content

This report, prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June 2025, examines the challenges and opportunities in Peru's fiscal decentralization framework with a focus on how it affects the country's potential as a leading critical mineral exporter. The analysis covers the distribution of resource-based revenues, the execution of local public investment, and the impact of these processes on public goods provision, social conflicts, and economic development.

Main Issues and Findings

1. Mining Wealth and Social Conflicts

• Peru's mining sector, particularly its critical mineral reserves, holds significant potential to drive economic growth.
• However, many mining projects have been stalled due to social conflicts, often stemming from local communities' perception that they do not benefit from mining activities.
• Notable examples include the Tía María project, which has been delayed since 2009 due to concerns over water availability and environmental risks.
• Social conflicts related to mining have increased since 2019, despite prices remaining high.

2. Fiscal Decentralization Framework

• Fiscal decentralization in Peru began in 2002 with the Constitutional Reform and continued with the Fiscal Decentralization Law in 2004.
• The reform aimed to transfer spending responsibilities and resources to subnational governments, but an electoral setback in 2005 halted the creation of macro-regions, leaving the framework incomplete.
• Regional governments rely heavily on discretionary transfers from the central government, which limits their autonomy.
• District governments primarily depend on rule-based transfers such as the canon (resource-based revenue) and FONCOMUN (equalizing transfer), with the canon becoming the dominant source of revenue over time.

3. Revenue Composition and Imbalance

• District revenues are highly dependent on the canon, which has led to vertical imbalance (a high ratio of local spending to locally-raised revenues).
• The canon, which is 50% of corporate income taxes and royalties from natural resource production, disproportionately benefits producing districts.
• The FONCOMUN, a 2% VAT surcharge, is distributed based on population and development needs but is not sufficient to equalize resources effectively.
• Revenue inequality is significant, with some districts receiving over 18 times more resources per capita than others.

4. Public Investment Efficiency

• Peru's public investment is high, averaging around 5% of GDP, but its efficiency is low, especially at the district level.
• Districts account for about 40% of total public investment, but only about 40% of projects registered before 2010 were completed by August 2024.
• Districts face challenges in executing projects, including cost overruns (average of 12%) and delays (average of 8 months to start, 17 months to complete).
• Many districts lack the capacity and expertise to manage large-scale projects, leading to a preference for smaller, less transformative initiatives.

5. Political and Institutional Constraints

• District projects often have short horizons, with average durations of 7 months (programmed) and 16 months (actual), likely due to the four-year term of local officials without re-election.
• Political cycles influence project selection and funding, with a surge in registrations and payments shortly after new administrations take office.
• This pattern increases the risk of project abandonment, cost overruns, and delays, reducing the quality and impact of public investment.

6. Impact on Public Goods and Development

• The report finds mixed evidence on whether local transfers improve public goods provision and economic development.
• While canon transfers are associated with increased local public investment and public goods, their impact on economic development is inconsistent.
• Some studies suggest positive effects, while others indicate U-shaped relationships or negligible impacts.
• The decentralization process has not led to significant improvements in public goods provision or reduced social conflicts, highlighting the need for reform.

Key Recommendations

• Improve the distribution of resource-based revenues to ensure equitable sharing and better public goods provision.
• Replace discretionary transfers with rule-based mechanisms to enhance transparency and accountability.
• Strengthen central government oversight to ensure effective implementation of local investment projects.
• Increase subnational capacity and coordination to improve the efficiency and impact of public investment.
• Address the volatility of resource-based revenues to support more stable and sustainable local development.

Conclusion

The report emphasizes that while Peru's fiscal decentralization has enabled some level of subnational governance, its current framework is inadequate to support the country's ambitions as a critical mineral exporter. The reliance on volatile resource revenues, limited local capacity, and political cycles hinders the effective use of public investment to address local development needs and reduce social conflicts. A more robust and equitable fiscal decentralization framework is essential to unlock the full potential of Peru's mining wealth and ensure inclusive economic development.