斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-Arms-flows-and-the-conflict-in-Somalia_12页_365kb

报告摘要

ARMS FLOWS AND THE CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

I. Core Content

This document provides an analysis of arms flows to Somalia and to external actors involved in the conflict, particularly focusing on the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Somali opposition groups, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. It highlights the complex interplay between international arms embargoes, military support, and the risks associated with arms supply to these actors.

II. Main Points

1. Arms Embargo and Its Modifications

A UN arms embargo on Somalia was imposed in 1992, initially banning arms and military equipment to all actors, including the TFG.
In 2006, the embargo was amended to allow arms supplies to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
In February 2007, the embargo was further modified to permit arms supplies to TFG security forces, with prior approval from the UN Sanctions Committee.
In November 2008, the UN imposed an arms embargo on entities violating the embargo, including Eritrea.
In December 2009, the UN formally imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea due to its involvement in the conflict with Djibouti and its support for Somali opposition groups.

2. Arms Supplies to Somali Opposition Groups

Somali opposition groups, including al-Shabab, have consistently obtained weapons from external sources.
Eritrea is accused of providing political, financial, and material support, including arms and training, to these groups since at least 2007.
Commercial arms imports, mainly from Yemen, are a major and consistent source of arms for opposition and criminal groups.
Captured TFG and AMISOM stockpiles have also been used by opposition groups, with reports of illicit sales by TFG and AMISOM personnel.
Ugandan and Ethiopian military personnel have been accused of selling arms from their own stockpiles to the Somali arms market.

3. Arms Supplies to the TFG

The TFG received arms from various sources, including Uganda, Ethiopia, and the US.
Ethiopia has been a principal supplier of arms, ammunition, and training to the TFG since 2005.
Uganda delivered 94 tonnes of weapons to the TFG in 2009, including rifles, machine guns, and mortars.
The US has provided military assistance to the TFG, including cash to procure weapons locally, though details on tracking and control are limited.
EU member states have not supplied arms directly to the TFG, despite providing training through the EU Training Mission (EUTM), indicating a policy of non-arms supply.

4. Risks of Arms Supply

Arms supplied to the TFG may be diverted to opposition groups, undermining the intended support.
The TFG has been accused of human rights abuses and indiscriminate attacks on civilians.
Arms supplied to Ethiopia risk escalating tensions with Eritrea, strengthening repression, and contributing to regional conflicts.
AMISOM contributors, including Burundi and Uganda, have also been accused of human rights violations and diverting arms to conflict zones.

III. Key Information

Al-Shabab is a major armed opposition group in Somalia, controlling large parts of the country.
Eritrea is a key external supporter of al-Shabab, aiming to counter Ethiopian influence.
Yemen is a major source of commercial arms imports to Somalia, though restrictions in 2008 have reduced the volume and increased prices.
TFG forces are under-equipped, and arms supplies have been crucial to their survival.
EU member states have denied arms export licenses to Ethiopia and Eritrea, citing human rights concerns and regional stability.
Ethiopia has received military equipment from the US and EU (e.g., $11 million in 2005–2008), though these amounts are relatively small compared to other US allies.
AMISOM is in need of equipment and has faced challenges due to inadequate funding and logistical shortcomings.

IV. Conclusion

The arms embargo on Somalia remains in place, with limited exceptions for the TFG and AMISOM.
Arms flows continue to support both state and non-state actors, despite international restrictions.
Eritrea and Ethiopia are key players in the conflict, with arms supplies posing significant risks.
TFG and AMISOM lack effective systems for controlling arms stockpiles, leading to diversion and misuse.
The international community remains divided on the issue of arms supply, with EU countries more cautious than the US.