斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所-The-crisis-of-nuclear-arms-control-and-its-impact-on-European-security_16页_695kb

THE CRISIS OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND ITS IMPACT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY

I. Introduction

The system of nuclear arms control, initially developed during the Cold War as a US-Soviet initiative, is currently in crisis. The European Union (EU) and its member states have been negatively impacted by this erosion, yet they have remained passive observers rather than active participants. The paper argues that the EU should take a more proactive role in rethinking the nuclear arms control architecture to address the major nuclear security threats and challenges facing Europe.

II. Nuclear Arms Control and Its Contribution to European Security

Nuclear arms control emerged in the 20th century as a response to the threat of nuclear war, particularly during the Cold War. It aimed to reduce the likelihood of war, limit its scope, and manage the financial and political costs of maintaining nuclear capabilities. Key treaties and agreements included:

• SALT I and II (1970s): Limited the development of strategic nuclear weapons.
• INF Treaty (1987): Eliminated intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
• START I, II, III, and New START (1990s–2010s): Focused on reducing the number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems.
• Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) (1991–1992): Resulted in the withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from European territories.

Although European states were not directly involved in these negotiations, they were consulted and influenced the strategic dialogue. The INF Treaty and PNIs were especially important for European security, as they contributed to the reduction of nuclear risks and supported nuclear non-proliferation efforts. However, concerns persisted regarding the focus on strategic weapons and the exclusion of non-strategic ones, as well as the independence of European nuclear states like France and the UK.

III. Current State of the Nuclear Arms Control Architecture

• New START (2010): Still in force until 2021, with provisions for verification and transparency. It limits strategic delivery systems and warheads but does not cover tactical nuclear weapons.
• INF Treaty (1987): Expired in August 2019 after the US and Russia accused each other of violations. Both sides have since restarted development of intermediate-range missiles.
• PNIs: Non-binding commitments that led to the withdrawal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe, though their current relevance is debated, especially regarding Russia.
• NATO–Russia Founding Act (1997): Committed NATO to not deploy nuclear weapons in newly admitted member states.

IV. Causes of the Nuclear Arms Control Crisis

1. Political Shifts: The decline in the perceived utility of arms control, especially after the Cold War, and the increasing focus on deterrence rather than restraint.
2. Structural Limitations: The US and Russia's adherence to Cold War-era arms control frameworks, which are ill-suited for addressing modern security challenges involving new technologies.
3. Technological Advancements: The rise of cyber, hypersonic, and AI capabilities has introduced new risks and complexities not covered by existing treaties. These technologies complicate the verification and enforcement of arms control agreements.
4. Strategic Competition: The growing strategic importance of China and the shift in the international order have strained the US–Russia relationship and reduced the willingness to engage in arms control.

V. Scenarios for the Future

1. Continuation: Extension of New START beyond 2021, potentially as a stop-gap measure or political gesture.
2. Broadening and Trilateralization: Proposals to expand the scope of bilateral treaties to include non-strategic systems or involve China in trilateral negotiations.
3. Discontinuation: A scenario where no new treaties are negotiated, and the existing framework is abandoned. This could lead to increased security dilemma pressures and potential nuclear escalation.
4. Non-Treaty-Based Framework: Emphasizing dialogue, voluntary restraint, and political declarations over legally binding treaties. This approach is better suited to the complex and multi-actor security landscape but lacks enforceability and verification mechanisms.

A new arms control agenda should address a broader range of capabilities, including emerging technologies, and involve more actors in the process. It would require more flexible and imaginative treaty drafting, including asymmetric obligations and variable thresholds.

VI. Impact on European Security

The collapse of the INF Treaty and the erosion of the broader arms control system have increased the risk of nuclear escalation and reduced strategic stability in Europe. The absence of binding agreements has created uncertainty and mistrust among European states and their NATO allies. While the New START remains in place, it is not sufficient to address all modern security challenges. European states have shown mixed support for arms control, with some expressing concerns about the US–Russia focus and the exclusion of their own interests. The future of European security will depend on the EU and its member states taking a more active role in shaping the nuclear arms control agenda.