2011年-BIS国际清算银行_Central_bank_governance_and_financial_stability_91页_951kb

Summary of Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability

Core Content

This report, authored by the Central Bank Governance Group and chaired by Stefan Ingves, explores the evolving role of central banks in financial stability policy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. It highlights the challenges and opportunities that arise when central banks take on new financial stability responsibilities, particularly in relation to macroprudential policy and crisis management. The report is not a prescriptive guide but rather a "roadmap" that discusses various institutional arrangements and their implications.

Main Conclusions

The Study Group concluded that:

• Central banks must be involved in the formulation and execution of financial stability policy to ensure its effectiveness.
• Financial stability mandates and governance arrangements should be compatible with monetary policy responsibilities.
• A formal mandate is essential for central banks to have a clear role in financial stability, even if it is difficult to define.
• Ex ante clarity about the roles of all authorities involved in financial stability policy is crucial for effective and rapid decision-making.
• Autonomy is necessary to protect central banks from short-term political pressures and undue influence.
• Accountability mechanisms should support, rather than undermine, central bank autonomy.
• Central banks need control over their balance sheet to effectively manage financial stability responsibilities.
• The mechanisms for transferring financial risks to the Treasury should be clearly defined.

Key Issues and Considerations

The report outlines several key areas to be considered when central banks take on new financial stability responsibilities:

1. Explicitness of the mandate

   • A clear, formal mandate is necessary to reduce the risk of mismatch between public expectations and central bank capabilities.
   • Some central banks have explicit mandates for financial stability, while others rely on tradition or extra-statutory statements.

2. Information and analytical capacity

   • Central banks need access to a wide range of information to fulfill their financial stability functions.
   • This includes data on collateral quality, institutional solvency, systemically important entities, and interconnections within the financial system.
   • Central banks should have the legal authority to obtain information directly from financial firms.

3. Tools for financial stability policy

   • Central banks must have appropriate tools and authorities to implement financial stability policies.
   • These may include macroprudential instruments or the ability to prompt or require action from other authorities.

4. Synergies and conflicts in function allocation

   • The allocation of responsibilities among different agencies can lead to both synergies and conflicts.
   • Clear delineation of roles is important to manage these trade-offs effectively.

5. Financial risks from emergency actions

   • Emergency actions taken by central banks can carry significant financial risks.
   • Robust mechanisms are needed to transfer these risks to the Treasury or other entities.

6. Decision-making in crisis management

   • Decision-making during crises should be transparent and structured.
   • Inter-agency councils may serve as forums for information exchange or joint decision-making bodies.

7. Autonomy and accountability

   • Autonomy is crucial for the effective execution of financial stability policy.
   • Accountability mechanisms should ensure transparency and provide a basis for reviewing central bank actions.

Alternative Institutional Structures

The report examines four alternative institutional structures for the governance of the macroprudential function:

1. Macroprudential policy as a shared responsibility

   • Involves multi-agency councils for decision-making.
   • May include distributed or joint decision-making models.

2. A separate macroprudential agency with decentralised implementation

   • A dedicated agency could handle macroprudential responsibilities, with central banks focusing on monetary policy.

3. Macroprudential responsibility of the central bank; separate microprudential regulator

   • Central banks take on macroprudential functions, while microprudential regulation is handled by other entities.

4. Central bank as both macro- and microprudential policy agency; separate financial product safety regulator

   • Central banks manage both macro- and microprudential functions, while a separate body addresses financial product safety.

Pre-Crisis Arrangements

Prior to the financial crisis, central banks had varying mandates and powers related to financial stability:

• Mandates

  • Most central banks had oversight of payment systems.
  • A few had explicit mandates for macroprudential regulation, such as the Bank of Thailand and the Central Bank of Malaysia (after the 2009 Central Bank Act).

• Objectives

  • The clarity of financial stability objectives varied.
  • Central banks with broader mandates tended to have clearer objectives, though some had no specified objectives despite broad mandates.

• Use of microprudential instruments for systemic purposes

  • Central banks with microprudential supervisory roles had an easier path to implementing macroprudential policies.
  • Regulatory powers were more frequently used for macroprudential purposes in emerging market economies than in advanced economies.

Recent Innovations and Reforms

The report discusses recent reforms in financial stability governance, including:

• The introduction of new mandates and powers for central banks.
• The establishment of special resolution regimes for failing banks.
• Enhanced accountability and transparency mechanisms.
• The development of emergency lending frameworks.

These reforms are highlighted as examples of the various institutional solutions that can be adopted to address financial stability challenges.

Acknowledgements

The report was prepared with the assistance of the Secretariat of the Central Bank Governance Forum and Sveriges Riksbank staff. Special thanks are given to several contributors for their insights and expertise.

Conclusion

The report provides a comprehensive overview of the evolving governance structures for central banks in the context of financial stability. It emphasizes the importance of clarity, autonomy, and accountability in ensuring the effectiveness of financial stability policy. The study group's findings suggest that no one-size-fits-all approach exists, and that the design of governance arrangements must be tailored to the specific institutional and political environment.