2015年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Haiti_Ex_Post_Assessment_of_Longer_38页_796kb

HAITI: Ex Post Assessment of Longer-Term Program Engagement

Core Content

This report is an Ex Post Assessment (EPA) of Haiti's 2006 and 2010 Fund-supported programs conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and published in January 2015. It evaluates the performance of these programs and provides recommendations for future engagement with the IMF.

Main Objectives of the Programs

• Preserving macroeconomic stability
• Creating conditions for sustained economic growth
• Promoting structural reforms to address long-standing governance and transparency issues
• Improving revenue mobilization to increase fiscal space and reduce vulnerabilities
• Supporting poverty reduction through growth and improved public services

Key Programs and Context

2006 PRGF/ECF-Supported Program

• Context: Haiti was making progress toward macroeconomic stabilization, with a focus on reducing inflation and fiscal dominance of monetary policy.
• Objectives: Consolidate macroeconomic stability, reduce inflation, maintain fiscal discipline, and improve public financial management.
• Performance:
  • Inflation dropped to single digits.
  • Central bank credit to the government was eliminated.
  • Revenue administration improved, with tax revenue increasing steadily.
  • Growth averaged 2.0% during 2005-06 and 2.2% during the program period (2007-14).

2010 ECF-Supported Program

• Context: Launched after the devastating January 12, 2010 earthquake, which caused massive destruction and a large inflow of aid.
• Objectives:
  • Support post-earthquake reconstruction and growth.
  • Ensure basic treasury and payments system functionality.
  • Address aid inflow and manage risks of exchange rate appreciation and "Dutch disease."
• Performance:
  • Growth averaged 2.1% during the program period (2010-14), below the projected 4.6%.
  • Public investment increased more slowly than planned, reaching 14% of GDP in 2011 instead of 21%.
  • Fiscal deficits exceeded initial projections, reaching 6-7% of GDP by the end of the program, mainly due to Petrocaribe borrowing.
  • Structural reforms progressed, but implementation was slower than expected, especially in areas like the energy sector and tax system.

Program Design

Quantitative Conditions

• Both programs aimed to contain inflation and increase international reserves.
• They included ceilings on central bank credit and monetary aggregates.
• No explicit targets for overall fiscal deficit, which led to significant deficits during the 2010 program.
• The 2010 program was less stringent on some fiscal targets due to uncertainty about aid inflows and revenue availability.

Structural Conditionality

• The 2006 program focused more on central bank and financial sector reforms, with 44% of conditions in this area.
• The 2010 program emphasized fiscal reforms, which accounted for 80% of its structural conditions.
• Key structural reforms included:
  • Revenue administration improvements (e.g., expanding the central taxpayer file, customs code implementation).
  • Public financial management measures (e.g., debt management unit, Treasury Single Account).
  • Legal and institutional frameworks (e.g., new banking law, public debt law).

Program Performance and Challenges

Macroeconomic Outcomes

• Inflation remained in single digits, which was a success.
• International reserves increased more than expected, helping to stabilize the exchange rate.
• Growth was lower than projected, with actual growth at 2.2% during the program period.
• Fiscal deficits exceeded initial expectations, especially in the 2010 program, due to large aid inflows and lack of fiscal constraints.

Structural Reforms

• Progress was mixed, with some reforms implemented but others delayed.
• Fiscal reforms were more advanced than structural reforms.
• The implementation of reforms was slowed by political instability, capacity constraints, and lack of coordination among stakeholders and donors.
• Technical assistance was used to support reforms, with a notable increase after the earthquake.

Key Lessons and Recommendations

• Cautious growth assumptions are needed, especially in fragile states.
• Explicit fiscal anchors (e.g., primary deficit limits, debt sustainability targets) should be included in future programs.
• Structural reforms should be scaled back due to capacity constraints, and prior actions should be used strategically to reinforce compliance.
• Reforms should be implemented gradually to ensure steady progress without unrealistic expectations.
• Consensus building and stakeholder ownership are critical for the success of reform agendas.
• Coordination among donors is essential to avoid inefficiencies in aid usage and ensure alignment with program goals.

Conclusion

• The programs were successful in promoting macroeconomic stability.
• However, growth and structural reform outcomes were below expectations.
• Fiscal vulnerabilities emerged, particularly due to reliance on Petrocaribe financing.
• Future engagement with the Fund should be more strategic, with clearer fiscal targets and better coordination to support sustainable development and poverty reduction in Haiti.

Key Information Summary

• Number of Fund-supported programs: 28 since 1953.
• Program periods: 2006-2010 (PRGF), 2010-2014 (ECF).
• Growth projections: 4% (2006 program), 4.6% (2010 program), 5-6% (medium to long term).
• Actual growth: 2.2% (2006 program), 2.1% (2010 program).
• Fiscal deficit: Reached 6-7% of GDP by the end of the 2010 program.
• Petrocaribe borrowing: Became a significant fiscal vulnerability.
• Technical assistance: Increased significantly, especially in the post-earthquake period.
• Recommendations: More cautious growth assumptions, explicit fiscal anchors, and better coordination and capacity building.