2015年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Reforming_the_Fund39s_Policy_on_Non_34页_1mb

IMF Policy Paper Summary: Reforming the Fund's Policy on Non-Toleration of Arrears to Official Creditors

Core Content

This IMF policy paper proposes a reform to the Fund's Non-Toleration of Arrears (NTP) policy, which currently prevents Fund lending to countries with unresolved arrears to official bilateral creditors, unless the arrears are covered by a Paris Club agreement or the creditor consents to the Fund's financing.

The reform is part of a broader effort to improve the Fund's legal and policy frameworks in response to changes in the sovereign debt restructuring landscape, as outlined in the 2013 Paper. The goal is to strengthen incentives for collective action among official creditors and reduce the risk of holdouts that could delay or prevent Fund assistance.

Main Issues and Challenges

• Holdout Risk: The current NTP policy can allow non-contributing official bilateral creditors to exercise a veto over Fund lending, even if they are not part of the financing agreement.
• Paris Club Dependence: The policy relies heavily on the Paris Club's conventions and practices, which are becoming less representative as more official creditors are non-Paris Club members.
• Changing Composition of Official Creditors: Non-Paris Club creditors, such as China, Brazil, India, and Saudi Arabia, are now holding a significant share of official bilateral claims, particularly on low-income countries.
• Uneven Debt Relief: Non-Paris Club creditors have provided less than half of the expected debt relief, and the speed of relief has been slow, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the current policy.

Staff's Proposed Modification

The proposed reform introduces a two-step process for Fund lending in the presence of arrears to official bilateral creditors:

1. First Step - Consensus Among Creditors: All creditors should be encouraged to reach a consensus. The Fund would recognize agreements among creditors reached in other representative fora, if such fora emerge.
2. Second Step - Lending into Arrears: If consensus cannot be reached, the Fund may consider lending into arrears under carefully circumscribed circumstances, provided:
   • The Fund's assistance is needed urgently.
   • The debtor is making good faith efforts to reach an agreement.
   • The absence of a debt restructuring is due to the unwillingness of creditors to agree with the Fund's program parameters.
   • The decision does not negatively affect the Fund's ability to mobilize official financing packages in the future.

This approach aims to protect official bilateral creditors while also ensuring that timely financial assistance can be provided to members in need.

Likely Impact

• Encourages Collective Action: The reform promotes coordination among official creditors, reducing the risk of holdouts.
• Maintains Safeguards: It continues to protect official bilateral creditors by requiring good faith efforts and ensuring that Fund lending decisions do not undermine future official financing.
• Supports Fund Mandate: It ensures that the Fund can still provide timely balance of payments assistance, even in the presence of arrears.

Next Steps

• If the Executive Board approves the proposed modification, the new policy will apply to all future Fund disbursements, including those under existing arrangements.
• The reform is expected to be implemented immediately upon approval.

Key Information

• The NTP policy is not proposed to be altered in relation to multilateral creditors.
• The Paris Club's comparability of treatment principle is central to the current policy, but its application is becoming less relevant due to the increasing share of non-Paris Club creditors.
• The Lending-Into-Arrears (LIA) policy for private creditors is not affected by this reform.
• The Holdout Problem is a major concern, particularly in the context of non-Paris Club creditors.
• The proposed policy would apply to arrears owed to official bilateral creditors and would be subject to Board approval.

Supporting Data

• Figure 1: Shows the average hiatus period for new external bond issuances during crises (around 5 years).
• Figure 2: Illustrates the NPV haircuts on official and private claims in sovereign debt restructurings, showing that official creditors typically receive more favorable treatment.
• Figure 3: Highlights the changing composition of official bilateral claims, with non-Paris Club creditors now holding a significant share.
• Table 1: Provides a summary of official sector contributions in selected Fund-supported programs, showing that contributions from official creditors can be substantial.
• Table 2: Shows the timeframe and delivery of assistance from non-Paris Club creditors, indicating delays and uneven participation.

Conclusion

The reform seeks to modernize the Fund's approach to managing arrears owed to official bilateral creditors, ensuring that collective action is incentivized, holdout risks are reduced, and the Fund's ability to provide timely assistance is preserved. It reflects the evolving landscape of official creditor involvement and the need for a more flexible and equitable policy framework.