战略与国际研究中心-CSIS-Trilateral-Track-2-Nuclear-Dialogues-Consensus-Statement_7页_138kb

报告摘要

Summary of the Trilateral Nuclear Dialogues: Toward a Common P3 Approach on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Energy Use, Disarmament and Material Security

Introduction

The document outlines a Trilateral Nuclear Dialogue among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France (P3) to address nuclear non-proliferation, energy use, disarmament, and material security. It highlights the increased risks of nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism, and the fragility of the NPT regime, emphasizing the need for a unified and coordinated approach to strengthen global nuclear security. The P3 nations are called upon to lead in this effort, especially in the context of the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, and to maintain unity even while engaging with other nuclear powers like Russia and China.

Core Content

The document is a non-paper produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), based on discussions in London, Paris, and Washington. It presents a Track 2 consensus among P3 nations on a set of strategic assumptions and policy goals aimed at enhancing the non-proliferation regime and creating a safer world.

Main Views and Key Points

1. Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Regime

North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and tested nuclear weapons.
Iran and Syria are non-compliant with the treaty.
Non-state actors pose a significant risk due to the presence of highly enriched uranium in over 40 countries.
Nuclear energy expansion increases the risk of proliferation.
P3 nations have made significant disarmament progress, but China continues to build its nuclear arsenal.

2. Shared Assumptions and Objectives

The P3 recognize the importance of nuclear deterrence in maintaining international stability.
They believe in undiminished security for all as a principle for achieving a world without nuclear weapons.
The NPT and its Article VI require all states to support the goal of disarmament and non-proliferation.
The P3 should lead in strengthening the rule of law and enhancing compliance with non-proliferation commitments.

3. Common Policy Agenda

Strengthen the NPT regime by enforcing rules, improving compliance mechanisms, and empowering the IAEA.
Achieve nuclear disarmament through bilateral and multilateral agreements, including a follow-on START treaty, CTBT ratification, and a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
Promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy while ensuring it does not increase proliferation risks.
Secure global nuclear material to prevent nuclear terrorism and ensure the safety of nuclear weapons and materials.

Specific Initiatives and Tactics

1. Strengthening the Non-Proliferation Regime

Implement the Additional Protocol as a standard for verifying compliance.
Clarify procedures for NPT withdrawal, including justification to the Security Council and special inspections.
Establish penalties for abuse of the withdrawal right.
Enhance IAEA authority, including direct reporting to the Security Council and expanded inspections.
Increase IAEA resources and improve management by 2011.

2. Pursuing Disarmament

Finalize the follow-on START treaty by December 2009 and ratify it by May 2010.
Encourage all nuclear weapon states to declare their stockpiles and commit to not increasing them before the RevCon.
Negotiate a further U.S.-Russian treaty for additional nuclear reductions.
Achieve CTBT ratification by the U.S. and China by December 2010, and the remaining seven countries by 2012.
Work toward a FMCT by 2015, with an immediate moratorium on fissile material production.

3. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Establish an international fuel assurance system by 2011.
Ensure assured return of spent fuel by 2012.
Create an international nuclear energy fund to support proliferation-resistant projects.
Develop new proliferation-resistant technologies.
Limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology by adopting NSG guidelines.

4. Securing Global Nuclear Inventories

Create a Global Nuclear Database by December 2010 under IAEA administration.
Develop international forensics and verification capabilities.
Implement transparency measures on nuclear weapon stockpiles among P5 and globally.
Strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.
Provide security assistance to all states with nuclear material.
Foster best practices exchange among states with nuclear materials and those with nuclear weapons.

Conclusion

The document underscores that a common P3 approach is essential for addressing global nuclear challenges and achieving long-term security. It emphasizes that success should be measured by progress on specific initiatives rather than the adoption of a final document at the NPT RevCon. The P3 must coordinate their efforts, maintain unity, and engage with other nuclear powers to build a broader consensus. The goal is to create a safer world through non-proliferation, disarmament, and material security, with a focus on long-term, generational efforts.