战略与国际研究中心-CSIS-European-Trilateral-Track-II-Nuclear-Dialogue_-2012-Consensus-Statement_6页_120kb

CSIS European Trilateral Track II Nuclear Dialogue Summary

Core Content

The CSIS European Trilateral Track II Nuclear Dialogue was established in 2009 to enhance nuclear cooperation among the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The group aimed to identify areas of consensus and promote a unified approach to nuclear issues, particularly in preparation for the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. From 2009 to 2012, the dialogue held three annual meetings, each in the capital of one of the three countries, and produced consensus policy statements to foster trilateral understanding of nuclear challenges.

Main Issues and Views

NATO and Defense Spending

• The economic crisis in Europe and the weak U.S. recovery have led to reduced defense spending in NATO nations, with a poor track record of meeting commitments.
• NATO reaffirmed its support for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe at the 2012 Chicago Summit, emphasizing their deterrent and reassurance value.
• The group urges the U.S. to maintain its European-based nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as well as funding dual-capable aircraft.
• Missile defense under the phased adaptive approach should continue to protect NATO from Iran's ballistic missile threat.

Russia

• The relationship between NATO and Russia has deteriorated significantly, with Russia using nuclear threats against NATO members.
• Russia views NATO as a military danger, while NATO does not reciprocate this stance.
• The group believes NATO should not abandon its missile defense strategy, despite Russian attempts to influence European public opinion.
• Cooperation with Russia on missile defense is possible and in both parties' interests, but Russia is unlikely to accept NATO's system without conditions.

Iran

• The dialogue has focused on the implications of Iran becoming a nuclear-armed state.
• A nuclear-armed Iran is unlikely to engage in large-scale conventional aggression due to lack of conventional forces.
• The group is cautious about the Iranian leadership's nuclear use, as they understand the consequences of retaliation.
• Tactical nuclear use by Iran in a conventional conflict could be a risk, and declaratory policies should clearly reject such a tactic.
• The group remains concerned about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East but has not yet agreed on a unified response.

Asia

• Discussions on Asia and the P-3's role have only recently begun.
• The group sees value in dialogue with China, especially regarding the nuclear risks posed by India and Pakistan.
• China is increasingly open to Track 1.5 and Track 2 discussions, suggesting a potential path to formal dialogue.
• The P-5 dialogue offers a framework to press China for transparency.
• China's force posture remains opaque, but it is consistent with modernization efforts to ensure survivability.

21st Century Deterrence

• Cold War deterrence was based on existential threats and bipolar ideological struggles, but 21st century deterrence is more complex.
• It involves multiple actors, domains (land, sea, air, space, cyberspace), and diverse capabilities (nuclear, conventional, cyber).
• The concept of "cross-domain deterrence" is misleading; it is not about deterring domains, but individual actors.
• Deterrence by denial may be less credible due to the increased use of cyber capabilities.
• Deterrence by punishment is suggested as a more viable approach, though attribution in cyberspace is challenging.
• The group supports explicitly ruling out nuclear retaliation for cyber attacks to enhance credibility.
• A common understanding of deterrence principles is needed to guide internal doctrine development and public policy statements.

Key Participants

United States

• Barry Blechman (Stimson Center)
• Linton Brooks (Former NNSA Administrator)
• Eric Edelman (CSIS)
• Stephen Flanagan (CSIS)
• Kathleen McInnis (CSIS)
• Franklin Miller (CSIS)
• Clark Murdock (CSIS)
• Robert Nurick (Atlantic Council)
• George Perkovich (Carnegie Endowment)
• Kori Schake (Hoover Institution)
• James Tegnelia (Former DTRA Director)

United Kingdom

• Gordon Barrass (LSE IDEAS)
• Desmond Bowen (Former MoD Policy Director)
• Tim Hare (MoD Nuclear Policy Consultant)
• David Jarvis (UK Project on Nuclear Issues)
• Sir Richard Mottram (LSE)
• Sir David Omand (King's College London)
• Sir Kevin Tebbit (Queen Mary University)

France

• Benoit d'Aboville (Former NATO Ambassador)
• Marc Perrin de Brichambaut (Conseil d'Etat)
• Camille Grand (FRS)
• Benjamin Hautecouverture (FRS)
• Jean-François Pactet (CSIS)
• Bruno Racine (National Library of France)
• Guillaume Schlumberger (FRS)
• Bernard Sitt (CISAC)
• Bruno Tertrais (FRS)

Conclusion

The CSIS European Trilateral Track II Nuclear Dialogue underscores the importance of nuclear cooperation among the P-3 nations in a complex and financially constrained global security environment. It highlights the need for coordinated defense spending, consistent deterrence policies, and engagement with key nuclear actors such as Russia and Iran. The dialogue also emphasizes the evolving nature of deterrence in the 21st century, calling for greater clarity and common principles to guide future policy and public statements.