2013年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_State_Capture_and_Widespread_Corruption_in_Serbia_37页_378kb

Summary of "State Capture and Widespread Corruption in Serbia"

Core Content

This document, authored by Vesna Pesic, examines the phenomenon of state capture in Serbia and its connection to widespread corruption, which has become a significant barrier to the country's democratic and institutional transition. The author argues that state capture is not merely about individual acts of corruption but a systemic issue rooted in the political and economic elites who have taken control of key state institutions and public resources for their own benefit.

Main Viewpoints

• State capture is defined as the influence of external groups over state institutions and policies, undermining public good and the rule of law.
• The political party leadership is the primary agent of state capture, using mechanisms to consolidate power and control over state functions.
• The mechanisms of state capture include a feudal-style division of power, where each party in the ruling coalition controls specific ministries and public institutions as if they were private fiefs.
• The Serbian parliament has been weakened, with MPs being bribed or offered multiple roles to ensure their loyalty to the ruling parties.
• The law on financing political parties is ineffective due to lack of enforcement and political will, allowing corruption to persist.
• The new Constitution has been criticized for reinforcing state capture by granting political elites greater control over public offices and institutions.

Key Information

1. The Extent of the Problem

• After the fall of Slobodan Milosevic in 2000, political corruption appeared to decline.
• However, with the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003 and the subsequent rise of nationalist parties, state capture intensified.
• The World Bank and Transparency International (TI) data indicate that Serbia's corruption levels have increased since 2002, with a CPI score of 3.0 in 2006, still among the lowest in the region.
• The EU integration process has been undermined by the lack of political will and institutional reforms.

2. State Capture Mechanisms

• Feudal/partisan system: The government is divided among ruling parties, with each party controlling a portion of the state apparatus based on its parliamentary representation.
• Vertical partition: Each party manages its own 'fief' through the allocation of ministries, public companies, and other state functions.
• Unaccountable appointments: Public offices are not filled based on merit but on party loyalty and influence, with minimal transparency.
• Corruption in public institutions: The Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education and Sport, and public companies are central to the capture process.
• Lack of regulatory effectiveness: Laws on anti-corruption and transparency have not been properly implemented, and their impact is limited.

3. Public Perception and Corruption Cases

• A survey conducted for this paper reveals that 53% of Serbians perceive corruption as widespread, and 56% believe it has increased in the past two years.
• Corruption cases involving the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Education and Sport, and public companies have been reported, including:
  • Privatisation scandals (e.g., National Savings Bank).
  • Bribery cases (e.g., the 'Brief Case Affair' involving the National Bank of Serbia).
  • Unlawful procurement (e.g., satellite purchase for monitoring Kosovo).
  • Graft in military and security sectors.
  • Corruption in energy and transportation sectors.
• These cases have not been resolved through legal means, and the government has remained silent.

4. Constitutional Changes and Institutional Weaknesses

• The new Constitution (approved in 2006) has been dubbed "The Functionary's Constitution" due to its reinforcement of party control over public offices.
• Key constitutional changes include:
  • MPs can irrevocably transfer their mandates to their parties, increasing party influence over legislative decisions.
  • Expanded immunity rights for MPs, reducing their accountability.
• The Basic Law on the Implementation of the Constitution was passed under a tacit agreement between parties to ensure their control over key institutions like the National Bank of Serbia and the Ombudsman.

5. Policy Recommendations

• Institutional reforms are needed to ensure transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.
• Merit-based appointments should replace the current system of party loyalty-based appointments.
• The law on financing political parties must be strictly enforced to prevent corruption in the political funding system.
• Judicial independence must be ensured to prevent executive overreach.
• Public engagement in the political process is essential to restore trust in institutions and combat the perception of state capture.

Conclusion

The document concludes that state capture in Serbia is a systemic and institutional problem that has deepened since the early 2000s. It has led to widespread corruption, undermined democratic transition, and eroded public trust in political and institutional systems. Without effective reforms, Serbia risks further institutional decay and a failure to meet the conditions for EU membership. The new Constitution does not address these issues but rather reinforces them, making the path to democratic governance more challenging.