2011年-WTO世界贸易组织_WTO_Decision-Making_for_the_Future_14页_169kb

WTO Decision-Making for the Future: Summary

Core Content

The paper "WTO Decision-Making for the Future" by Patrick Low explores the challenges and potential reforms in the World Trade Organization (WTO) decision-making process. As the WTO has expanded from 23 to 153 members, the complexity and diversity of trade issues have increased, making consensus-based decision-making increasingly difficult and inefficient. The author suggests that the WTO may need to consider alternative decision-making approaches, particularly the concept of critical mass decision-making, to enhance its effectiveness and responsiveness.

Main Viewpoints

1. Challenges of Consensus Decision-Making

• Slowness and Inertia: Consensus tends to favor the lowest common denominator, resulting in slow progress and inertia.
• Inequity in Influence: Larger countries have greater influence in consensus, making it difficult for smaller ones to challenge outcomes.
• Fragmentation Risk: The current consensus model may not be able to prevent the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs), which can fragment the multilateral trading system.

2. Rationale for Changing Decision Rules

• Efficiency: A more flexible decision rule could allow for faster and more effective decision-making.
• Agenda Flexibility: The WTO needs to adapt its agenda to address evolving trade needs and interests.
• Differentiated Rights and Obligations: A critical mass approach could better accommodate the diverse needs of members, offering a fairer and more legitimate system.

3. Critical Mass Decision-Making

• Definition: A critical mass exists when a sufficient number of WTO members, not necessarily all, agree on a cooperative action, which can be applied to both market access and rules-related negotiations.
• Advantages:
  • Encourages a more progressive and responsive WTO agenda.
  • Reduces the diversion of trade cooperation to RTAs.
  • Allows for more efficient differentiation of rights and obligations.
  • Promotes greater efficiency in multilateral negotiations.
• Examples: Agreements on telecommunications, financial services, and the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) have been negotiated under critical mass principles.

Key Information

1. Consensus vs. Voting

• The original GATT did not mandate consensus, but it became the de facto rule in the WTO.
• Voting is not currently a practical option due to the complexity of the WTO system and the reluctance of members to accept it, especially given the potential for coercion and the lack of a clear voting mechanism.

2. Single Undertaking

• The "single undertaking" principle requires all members to agree on the entire package of agreements, which was a key feature in the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round.
• It is seen as a procedural rule to prevent a subset of members from undermining the system, but it has also been perceived as coercive by some.

3. Critical Mass as a Solution

• The critical mass model allows for a subset of members to agree on specific rules or market access commitments without requiring universal consent.
• This approach can help maintain the coherence of the multilateral system while allowing for more flexible and responsive decision-making.

4. Non-Discrimination and Free-Riding

• The author argues that the MFN (Most-Favored-Nation) principle should apply to critical mass agreements, ensuring non-discrimination between signatories and non-signatories.
• Free-riding is not necessarily a problem if the agreement is welfare-enhancing and the benefits are broadly shared, even if some countries do not participate.

Institutional and Procedural Considerations

1. Proposing Critical Mass Agreements

• A prior understanding among members is necessary to justify the initiation of critical mass negotiations.
• Proposers must demonstrate the benefits and necessity of such an approach.
• The WTO Secretariat lacks the authority of an EU Commission, so the role of standing bodies in mediating and supporting such agreements is crucial.

2. Defining Critical Mass

• The critical mass is defined by the perceived level of support and commitment among members.
• The "market" concept plays a role in determining the threshold, as non-participating members may not have the capacity to affect the agreement.

3. Institutional Safeguards

• A review mechanism could be established to assess the need for expanding membership in critical mass agreements.
• Quantitative criteria may be used to evaluate participation readiness.
• Exclusiveness in administrative procedures could serve as an incentive for engagement.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that while consensus remains the standard decision rule, its limitations have become increasingly evident. A critical mass decision-making approach could offer a more flexible and efficient alternative, particularly in the context of sectoral market access negotiations. However, it must be accompanied by appropriate institutional and procedural safeguards to ensure equity, prevent fragmentation, and maintain the integrity of the multilateral trading system.