战略与国际研究中心-Exactly-How-Provocative-are-US_3页_274kb

KOREA CHAIR PLATFORM: Summary

Core Content

This report by Na Young Lee, Andy Lim, and Victor Cha, published on March 24, 2015, examines the relationship between U.S.-ROK military exercises and North Korean (DPRK) provocations over the past decade. It challenges the common perception that these exercises are a direct cause of North Korean aggression, suggesting instead that the impact is more nuanced and influenced by a variety of factors.

Main Points

1. Correlation Between Exercises and DPRK Behavior

• North Korea often responds to U.S.-ROK military exercises with rhetoric and kinetic actions, but the exercises do not necessarily cause these provocations.
• The report conducted an empirical analysis of the U.S.-DPRK bilateral relationship over the period 2005–2014 and found that the exercises generally do not lead to a deterioration of diplomatic relations.
• When the relationship was positive before the exercises, it remained positive afterward, despite North Korean criticisms.
• When the relationship was negative, the exercises tended to reinforce that negativity.

2. Compartmentalization of Reactions

• North Korea has the ability to compartmentalize its responses to U.S.-ROK exercises.
• During the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–2008), inter-Korean relations remained positive even though the DPRK criticized the exercises.
• This suggests that Pyongyang can distinguish between its relationship with South Korea and its stance toward the U.S.

3. Domestic Politics of ROK Influences DPRK Responses

• The report highlights that ROK domestic politics, rather than the military exercises themselves, can significantly influence DPRK behavior.
• In 2008, the shift from the Roh administration to the Lee Myung-bak administration led to a sharp deterioration in inter-Korean relations, despite the exercises having already begun.
• This indicates that the ROK's political changes may be more impactful than the exercises in shaping North Korean reactions.

4. Duration of Exercises Affects DPRK Provocations

• As the duration of U.S.-ROK exercises increased, the timing of DPRK provocations shifted.
• Before 2009, provocations tended to occur after the exercises, but after the exercises became multi-week, they often occurred before and during the exercise period.
• This suggests that the length of the exercises provides a window for DPRK to respond with kinetic actions.

5. Verbal Rhetoric as an Indicator

• DPRK verbal responses to the exercises are generally consistent, ranging from "hostile" to "benign."
• "Hostile legitimation" rhetoric frames the exercises as a prelude to a U.S. attack, while "benign" rhetoric includes vague warnings and propaganda about the KPA's capabilities.
• In years when DPRK rhetoric went beyond this range (e.g., 2009, 2010, 2013, 2014), small-scale provocations were observed during the exercise period.

Key Information

• Military Exercises Overview:

  • Before 1968, exercises were called "Counterblow" and "Strong Shield."
  • From 1978, the exercises were under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and expanded in scale.
  • The current exercises are "Key Resolve" and "Foal Eagle," which have been ongoing since 2008.

• Anomalies in the Study:

  • 2008 was an anomaly where positive inter-Korean relations turned negative after the exercises, attributed to ROK domestic politics.
  • 2012 was also an exception, with North Korea launching a satellite/missile and parading new ICBMs shortly before Kim Jong-un's first year in power and his grandfather's centenary.

• Rhetoric Analysis:

  • DPRK verbal responses were analyzed using official statements from the Foreign Ministry, KPA Commander, and KPA Panmunjom Mission, as well as North Korean news outlets like Rodong Shinmun and Minju Joson.

Conclusion

The report concludes that U.S.-ROK military exercises are not the primary driver of North Korean provocations. Instead, the overall state of U.S.-DPRK relations and ROK domestic politics play a more significant role in shaping Pyongyang's behavior. The duration of the exercises and the rhetoric used by the DPRK can serve as indicators of small-scale provocations, but not of major events like nuclear tests or long-range missile launches.