2018年-CEPS欧洲政策研究中心_Towards_Effective_and_Accountable_Leadership_of_the_Union_46页_412kb

Summary of "Towards Effective and Accountable Leadership of the Union: Options and Guidelines for Reform"

Core Content

This working paper, authored by Wouter Coussens and Ben Crum, explores the challenges and potential reforms to enhance the effectiveness, democracy, and institutional balance of EU leadership. The paper is part of the EPIN Working Paper series and addresses the evolving nature of the European Union, particularly in light of the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent enlargement processes.

Main Views

1. Election of the Commission President

• Current System (Amsterdam Treaty): The selection process is based on consensus in the European Council, which prioritizes avoiding vetoes over selecting the best candidate. This results in limited democratic accountability.
• Nice Treaty Changes: Introduces qualified majority voting (QMV) in the European Council, which could make the appointment more efficient and democratic. However, it also increases politicization.
• European Parliament Election: Seen as a more democratic option, as it would make the Commission President directly accountable to the EU citizenry, enhancing legitimacy and visibility. However, concerns remain about the Commission gaining too much power and the potential for institutional imbalance.
• National Parliaments and Congress of Parliamentarians: These alternatives are considered problematic due to lack of democratic merit, potential distortion of institutional balance, and unclear accountability mechanisms.

2. Reforming the Council Presidency

• Current System: The rotating Council Presidency, held by member states for six months, has become increasingly burdensome and inefficient, especially with the expansion of the Union and the rise of CFSP and JHA.
• Proposals for Reform:
  • Permanent EU President: Suggested by Chirac, Blair, and Aznar, this model could enhance external representation but risks strengthening the Council and large member states over smaller ones. It also fails to improve democratic legitimacy.
  • Dual Presidency Model (Franco-German Proposal): Could lead to a "parallel Europe" with two competing leadership structures, increasing the risk of conflict and deadlock.
• Unified Presidency: A potential solution to the dual presidency dilemma, combining the roles of the European Council President and the Commission President. This could enhance coordination and visibility, but requires careful design to prevent over-concentration of power and to ensure accountability to both the Council and Parliament.

Key Information

• Institutional Balance: The EU is neither a traditional state nor a normal international organization. Leadership reform must respect the delicate balance between national and supranational interests.
• Democracy: The European Parliament's legitimacy is currently questioned due to low voter turnout and fragmented national voting rules. Reforms should enhance its representative and accountability functions.
• Efficacy: The EU's growing responsibilities in areas like EMU, CFSP, and JHA demand more effective leadership. The current ad-hoc distribution of leadership roles hampers coordination and visibility.

Conclusion

The paper argues that a unified EU Presidency, directly elected or chosen through a Congress, could address the triple challenge of efficacy, democracy, and institutional balance. However, this model must be accompanied by reforms to ensure accountability to both the Council and Parliament, and to prevent the emergence of a "parallel Europe." The authors emphasize the need for a clearer division of responsibilities, enhanced coordination, and greater democratic engagement to realize an effective and accountable EU leadership structure.

Recommendations

• The Commission President should be elected by the European Parliament to increase democratic legitimacy.
• A unified EU Presidency could help streamline leadership and improve coordination, but must be subject to political checks and balances.
• Member states should retain a role in the selection of the Commission President and have the power to veto nominees for the College of Commissioners.
• The European Parliament's role should be strengthened to ensure it is not merely a passive observer but an active participant in the leadership process.
• A Congress of Parliamentarians may be a transitional option to ensure democratic legitimacy while preserving institutional balance.