战略与国际研究中心-India-and-the-Nonproliferation-Institutions_18页_2mb

Summary: India and the Nonproliferation Institutions

Core Content

This report, authored by C. Raja Mohan and published by the CSIS South Asia Program and the Nuclear Threat Initiative in December 2010, examines the evolving relationship between India and the global nonproliferation institutions, particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and export control regimes. It focuses on the "expectations gap" between India and the United States regarding India's role in the nonproliferation system.

Main Views

• India's Relationship with the NPT:
  India, once a supporter of arms control, has become a vocal critic of the NPT, viewing it as discriminatory. Despite its status as a nuclear weapons state, it has not joined the treaty, and this position remains a source of tension with the U.S. and other nations. However, India's participation in the global nuclear order through the civil nuclear initiative has created new opportunities for cooperation.

• Civil Nuclear Initiative (CNI):
  The CNI, negotiated between the U.S. and India in 2008, marked a significant shift in U.S. policy. It allowed India to access the global civilian nuclear market by separating its civilian and military nuclear programs and placing the former under IAEA safeguards. This initiative helped reduce the nuclear dispute between the two countries and laid the groundwork for a strategic partnership.

• India's Stance on PSI:
  The Proliferation Security Initiative, aimed at preventing the illicit transfer of WMD-related materials, was seen as a potential platform for India to contribute to global nonproliferation. However, India's non-NPT status and the SUA Convention raised concerns about its inclusion in the PSI. Despite some willingness to participate, India has not yet joined due to domestic and international sensitivities.

• Export Control Issues:
  India has long been excluded from multilateral export control groups like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. These restrictions have been a major point of contention, as India argues that its exclusion is based on political bias rather than noncompliance. The report suggests that aligning U.S. export controls with India's status as a strategic partner could help resolve this issue.

• Enrichment and Reprocessing:
  India has committed to not exporting enrichment and reprocessing technologies, in line with U.S. concerns over nuclear proliferation. It supports international fuel banks and the fissile materials cutoff treaty (FMCT), but fears that U.S. pressure could lead to restrictions on its access to these technologies. The NSG's "clean exemption" granted to India in 2008 is seen as a key factor in its ability to maintain its nuclear program.

• CTBT and FMCT:
  India has maintained a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998 and supports the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, it has not signed the treaty, as it believes the U.S. and China must first do so. Similarly, India's position on the FMCT is less significant compared to the Sino-U.S. dynamic in shaping the treaty's future.

Key Information

• India's Non-NPT Status:
  India has not joined the NPT, but it has not engaged in nuclear proliferation. This has led to criticism from some quarters, but also recognition from others that its position is not based on a desire to proliferate.

• NPT Universalization:
  There has been persistent pressure from the U.S. and other countries to universalize the NPT, including inviting India, Pakistan, and Israel to join. India has consistently rejected such calls, emphasizing its security needs and the discriminatory nature of the treaty.

• Strategic Partnership:
  The report argues that India, as an emerging global power, should move beyond its ideological stance against the NPT and embrace a more cooperative role in the nonproliferation regime. This would require the U.S. to find ways to accommodate India's status and recognize its contributions to global security.

• Mutual Understanding Needed:
  The report calls for a renewed and more flexible approach to India's participation in nonproliferation institutions. It suggests that India and the U.S. should find mutually acceptable commitments that allow India to be a full-fledged partner in the global nuclear order without requiring it to sign the NPT.

Conclusion

India's relationship with nonproliferation institutions is complex and shaped by historical grievances, strategic interests, and the evolving global nuclear order. While it has made significant strides in cooperating with the U.S. on nuclear issues, several obstacles remain. The report advocates for a more inclusive and pragmatic approach to India's participation in the nonproliferation system, emphasizing the need for mutual understanding and cooperation to bridge the "expectations gap."