IMF-在权力下放下预防财政危机_政府间政策和机构(英)-2025_35页_1mb
报告摘要
Summary
- Main Question: How can fiscal crises be prevented in decentralized fiscal systems?
- Key Instruments: Good public sector institutions, central government controls over subnational fiscal balances and borrowing, intergovernmental transfers, and subnational fiscal rules/administrative constraints.
- Fiscal Decentralization's Role: Increased spending decentralization to local governments correlates with a higher probability of fiscal crises. This effect is more pronounced in countries with local budget deficits and when central control over local borrowing is absent.
- Counteracting Measures:
- Intergovernmental Transfers: Reduce crisis probability through risk-sharing and stabilization, though they create moral hazard via soft budget constraints and the common pool problem.
- Central Controls: Such as fiscal rules and borrowing constraints reduce excessive spending and debt but may decrease fiscal flexibility.
- Good Governance: Strong institutions and low corruption mitigate the negative effects of decentralization on fiscal sustainability.
- Revenue Centralization: Associated with fewer crises, likely due to economies of scale and reduced tax competition externalities.
- Policy Implications:
- Fiscal decentralization should be accompanied by robust governance and institutional frameworks to mitigate moral hazard.
- Central government oversight through borrowing limits and fiscal rules can prevent local fiscal indiscipline.
- Intergovernmental transfers are useful tools for stabilization but should be designed carefully to minimize moral hazard.
- Good institutions are crucial for maintaining fiscal discipline under decentralization.
- Countries must balance the benefits of fiscal flexibility against the risks of reduced central capacity to manage instability.
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