2005年-世界发展银行全球_Trade_Preferences_and_Differential_Treatment_of_Developing_Countries__A_Selective_Survey_47页_474kb

Trade Preferences and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries: A Selective Survey Summary

Core Content

This paper provides a selective survey of the literature on special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries within the multilateral trading system, particularly focusing on non-reciprocal trade preferences and provisions that allow developing countries greater leeway in protectionist policies. It explores the rationales, institutional features, and economic effectiveness of SDT, emphasizing the impact of preferential market access and the debate over its continued relevance.

Main Views and Key Points

1. Rationale for SDT

• SDT aims to support developing countries' industrialization and economic growth by allowing them to use trade barriers (e.g., infant industry protection) and preferential market access.
• The original motivation for SDT came from economists like Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, who argued that developing countries needed to reduce import dependence and diversify away from traditional commodities.
• Unilateral trade preferences, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), were designed to help developing countries overcome protectionism in industrialized countries.

2. SDT in the GATT/WTO

• SDT was a central feature of the GATT and later the WTO, particularly in the 1960s.
• The GATT's Part IV (on Trade and Development) introduced the principle of limited reciprocity for developing countries.
• The Enabling Clause (1979) provided permanent legal cover for GSP, allowing it to be used without the need for temporary waivers.
• SDT provisions are "best endeavors" commitments, meaning they are not binding contractual obligations.

3. Economic Effectiveness of SDT

• There is significant debate over the economic effectiveness of SDT, especially preferential market access.
• Critics like Gardner Patterson (1965) and Walter Johnson (1967) argue that preferences can lead to trade diversion, specialization in uncompetitive sectors, political tensions, and attenuated incentives for multilateral liberalization.
• Preferences are often not as effective as expected because they are not mandatory and are subject to political and administrative pressures.
• The efficiency of preferences is limited by the fact that many products in developed countries already face zero tariffs, reducing the impact of preferential treatment.

4. Unilateral Market Access Programs

• The GSP is the most important unilateral preference scheme, with the EU and US being the main implementers.
• The US GSP:
  • Grants duty-free access to all developing countries and additional duty-free access to LDCs.
  • Includes eligibility criteria based on income level, trade practices, and human rights.
  • Features competitive need limits and graduation rules that can lead to loss of preference status.
  • Has 36 countries graduated from the program since 1976, including Singapore, Hong Kong, and Mexico.
• The EU GSP:
  • Uses a more codified approach to determine eligibility, including development indices.
  • Classifies products into non-sensitive and sensitive categories, with duty reductions ranging from 0% to 3.5%.
  • Includes safeguard clauses and special incentive arrangements for compliance with labor and environmental standards.
  • The Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative provides unlimited duty-free access to LDCs, except for bananas, rice, and sugar, which are subject to gradual liberalization.

5. Recent Developments and Policy Relevance

• SDT has regained policy interest following the Doha Development Agenda (2001), which emphasized development concerns in trade negotiations.
• The paper discusses recent contributions on whether SDT is still necessary and how it should be designed to better serve development objectives while maintaining multilateral trade rules.
• The debate on SDT has historical roots, with many issues raised in the 1960s still relevant today.
• The authors conclude that critics of unilateral preferences were prescient, as their concerns about ineffectiveness and distortions have been validated by subsequent evidence.

Key Information

• SDT includes non-reciprocal trade preferences and greater flexibility for developing countries in using protectionist measures.
• GSP is a key instrument of SDT, established in 1968 under UNCTAD.
• Unilateral preferences are often conditional, with rules of origin, product coverage, and graduation criteria.
• Economic analysis suggests that preferences may have limited impact due to zero tariffs in many sectors and distortions in trade flows.
• The WTO has become a more binding system since 1995, with developing countries now subject to more disciplines.
• The need for SDT is still debated, with some arguing that development rationale for trade interventions persists, while others believe multilateral liberalization is more effective.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that unilateral trade preferences have not delivered the expected benefits to developing countries, and that critics who questioned their value were correct in their assessments. It highlights the complexity of SDT and the need for more coherent and effective policies that balance development goals with multilateral trade principles.