彼得森经济研究所-欧盟碳边界调整措施能否推动世贸组织气候谈判？（英）-2021.11-14页_351kb

报告摘要

Summary of "21-23 Can EU Carbon Border Adjustment Measures Propel WTO Climate Talks?"

Core Content

The European Union (EU) is implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) as part of its broader "Fit for 55" climate policy package, which aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 and a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. The CBAM is designed to address carbon leakage, where firms might move production to countries with lower or no carbon pricing to avoid higher costs in the EU. By imposing carbon charges on imports, the EU seeks to level the playing field and encourage other nations to adopt stricter climate policies.

Main Viewpoints

The CBAM is a border tax mechanism that requires importers to declare and surrender CBAM certificates corresponding to the embedded emissions in their products.
The CBAM is not a tax but a tariff-like system that mirrors the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) in its carbon pricing approach.
The CBAM is likely to violate WTO rules, particularly GATT Articles I, II, and III, which prohibit discrimination and disguised trade restrictions.
The CBAM could be justified under Article XX of GATT, but its unilateral nature and lack of equivalence in carbon pricing with other countries may make it vulnerable to legal challenges.
The EU's climate policies, including the ETS, are already raising costs for firms, and the CBAM is intended to offset these costs for imports.

Key Information

CBAM Overview

Entry into force: January 1, 2023, with a three-year transition period until December 2025.
Covered goods: Initially limited to five carbon-intensive sectors: iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and cement.
Mechanism: Importers must submit a CBAM declaration annually, detailing the quantity of goods, embedded emissions, and number of certificates to surrender by May 31.
Certificate pricing: Based on average weekly prices of EU ETS allowances.
Penalty: €100 per certificate not surrendered.
Exemptions: Countries with a fully linked ETS or those integrated into the EU ETS through future agreements may be exempt.
Embedded emissions: Calculated using non-product-related production methods (NPR PPMs), which may conflict with WTO rules on like-product treatment.

Impact on Trading Partners

Major affected countries: Russia, China, Turkey, the UK, Ukraine, South Korea, and India.
EU imports from these countries: Account for 3% of total EU imports in 2020, but the CBAM's long-term impact could be much greater as its scope expands.
EU exports to these countries: Represent 60% of extra-EU-27 exports, making retaliation a real risk.
Political and economic reactions: These countries have expressed concerns that the CBAM is unilateral, discriminatory, and violates WTO principles.

Challenges and Concerns

WTO compatibility: The CBAM may be seen as arbitrary discrimination or a disguised trade restriction.
Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV): No international standard exists for calculating carbon footprints, leading to administrative costs and potential manipulation.
Equivalence issue: The CBAM credits carbon prices in foreign countries but not regulatory carbon abatement costs, creating asymmetry.
Political feasibility: A global carbon price floor, suggested by the IMF and WTO Director-General Okonjo-Iweala, is not politically realistic due to resistance to carbon taxes in the US and divergent carbon pricing levels globally.
Alternative proposals: The Climate Club (by William Nordhaus) and MRV-based mutual recognition agreements are seen as constructive alternatives, but they face political resistance due to common carbon pricing requirements.

Conclusion

The CBAM is a key part of the EU's climate strategy, aimed at preventing carbon leakage and encouraging global decarbonization. However, it raises significant legal and political concerns, particularly regarding WTO compliance, trade discrimination, and equivalence of carbon pricing. While the CBAM may push climate negotiations forward, its implementation and long-term success depend on international cooperation, transparent MRV systems, and negotiations that address global inequalities in climate policies. In the absence of such cooperation, the CBAM could exacerbate trade tensions and complicate multilateral climate talks.