国会预算办公室-关于国会预算办公室对房利美和房地美潜在变化的预算处理_需要知道的七件事（英）-2025.7_17页_831kb

CBO Budgetary Treatment:

• CBO considers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) effectively part of the federal government due to control by FHFA and Treasury ownership, treating their operations and financial activities as federal costs.
• Their mortgage guarantees are budgeted at a discount to market rates, creating tens of billions in budgetary costs on a fair-value basis, offset by projected savings later due to declining default rates.
• Treasury's implicit solvency guarantee and explicit preferred stock purchase agreements (enabling warrant exercise) are treated as intragovernmental transactions, not affecting the deficit directly.
• Releasing control would create budgetary effects: removal of subsidies (cost savings), potential loss of Treasury income (cost increase), costs from Treasury commitment fees (if implemented), and capital injection costs if buying shares from insiders.

Fair-Value Accounting:

• CBO measures GSE guarantee costs/savings at the time of origination using fair-value accounting to estimate the market price difference between private insurance and the guarantee fee.
• Fair-value incorporates market risk, predicting lifetime net present value (NPV) of fees less than NPV of obligations.
• FCRA accounting used by Treasury differs: it's accrual-based but excludes market risk and estimates costs/savings when actual cash flows occur.

Treasury's Role:

• Treasury holds senior preferred shares and warrants, effectively owning Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Preferred dividends and warrant exercise are intragovernmental.
• Selling Treasury's common stock later would generate federal revenue underfair-value accounting.
• Any explicit federal guarantee post-release would incur costs, measured based on risk and private capital buffers.

Two Illustrative Release Scenarios:

• Conversion (Conservatorship approach): Convert preferred shares to common (lose preferential status), exercise warrants to buy more common, issue new stock via public sale to fund capital reserves needed for release. Treasury receives common stock equating to $170B value; new investors pay $162B.
• Transfer (Receivership approach): FHFA transfers GSE legal status to new entities, transferring all assets/liabilities. Treasury sells its entire equity stake ($206B value) to public investors; this amount plus new stock proceeds funds the $162B needed capital reserves post-transfer.
• Budgetary Effects:
  • Conversion: Generates $XB budgetary savings compared to baseline (exact figure varies).
  • Transfer: No net budgetary save/cost* from sale alone, assuming price reflects full offset of government income removal + Treasury receipt*.
• • `* indicates differing interpretations in the original text's summary points.
• Both methods require injecting $162B to recapitalize; funding source differs.

Key Implications:

• Recapitalization and release fundamentally alter budget accounting, shifting fromfait-based FCRA estimates potentially incorporating market risk to fair-value estimates.
• The budgetary cost or savings depends on policy: ending diversification of Treasury's risk creates a cost, loss of GSE operating income creates savings.
• The exact fiscal impact hinges on the release mechanism (Conversion vs Transfer), investment interest rates, and Treasury share prices.