纽约联储-金融稳定理论符合现实（英）-2025.6_65页_774kb

The Theory of Financial Stability Meets Reality

Authors: Nina Boyarchenko, Kinda Hachem, Anya Kleymenova
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, June 2025

1. Introduction

• Banking is a heavily regulated industry experiencing frequent crises
  • Examples: S&L crisis (1980s), Global Financial Crisis (2007), Continental Illinois failure (1984), SVB crisis (2023).
• Core Problem:
  • Theoretical models propose bank regulations to address externalities (e.g., systemic risk), but real-world practices (accounting discretion) hinder regulation effectiveness.
  • Banks use accounting flexibility to "circumvent" regulations without increasing actual risk.

2. Key Findings

2.1. Conceptual Framework

• Balance Sheet Simplification: Banks have three primary choices: size, liquidity ratio, capital ratio.
• Dual Objectives:
  • Banks maximize private value, but regulations aim to align with social value (loss absorption, liquidity service).
  • Regulatory Evasion: Banks use accounting discretion to reduce the burden of capital or liquidity requirements.
• Implementation Constraint:
  • The planner must balance discretion (allowed by accounting standards) and regulation while navigating regulatory arbitrage (e.g., misreporting asset values).

2.2. Externalities Driving Regulation

• Coordination Failures:
  • Bank runs and contagion (e.g., depositor confidence and counterparty risk).
  • Empirical evidence: Interbank response to SVB crisis highlights contagion.
• Pecuniary Externalities:
  • Fire sales and liquidity spirals (e.g., during GFC).
• Limited Liability & Moral Hazard:
  • Banks not internalize risks, amplified by implicit government support (deposit insurance).

2.3. Accounting Discretion (Regulatory Arbitrage)

• Evasion Mechanisms:
  • Loan loss provisioning: Delayed recognition reduces reported risks.
  • Security classification: Off-balance-sheet structures (e.g., HTM vs. AFS) obscure capital needs.
  • Costs: Increases moral hazard, erodes financial stability.

2.4. Tradeoffs & Optimal Policy

• Discretion reduces comparability across banks but mitigates panic-based runs.
• Solutions must address:
  • Regulation effectiveness (e.g., capital vs. liquidity requirements).
  • Integration of accounting and regulatory frameworks (e.g., transparent loss recognition).

3. Conclusion & Research Opportunities

• Key Takeaway:
  • Banks must hedge both exogenous risks (e.g., fire sales) and endogenous risks (e.g., deposit runs).
• Actionable Steps:
  • Models should incorporate feedback between accounting standards and bank regulation.
  • Empirical research needed to understand depositor expectations and resolve stealthy risk reporting.

5. Future Research

• Mathematical modeling: Balance discretion and regulation vectors under multi-pronged financial threats.
• Behavioral focus: Integrate prediction of depositor's panic-driven logic into theoretical models.