CEPR-私人参与基础设施建设_公私伙伴关系扮演什么角色_（英）-2025_141页_3mb

PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE: ROLE OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

1 Introduction

• Infrastructure investment is critical for economic development, but traditional funding faces constraints due to public debt burdens.
• Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are considered a key mechanism to leverage private capital for crucial sectors like transport, energy, and social infrastructure.
• PPPs combine private sector expertise with budgetary constraints addressed through varied contract types (concession vs. availability-based).

2 Theoretical Underpinnings of PPPs in Infrastructure

• economics模型: PPPs balance risk-sharing and commitment. User-pay contracts (concessions) transfer use risks to private entities, while availability-based contracts keep operational risks with the public (Auriol & Saussier, 2025).
• Shadow cost of public funds (λ): In highly indebted nations with high public debt (e.g., France), PPPs may be preferred over traditional public financing. Lower shadow costs enable BOT concessions while addressing budgetary constraints.
• Efficiency gains: Bundling design/construction with long-term operation leverages private incentives to reduce operating costs, especially in sectors with high maintenance needs (e.g., district heating).

3 Empirical Findings on PPP Performance

• Infrastructure investment levels: PPPs are concentrated in transport and energy globally. In the EU, PPPs are dominated by transport (primarily concession-based). In Italy, PPP use declined due to definitional challenges and competition barriers.
• Renegotiation dynamics: Renegotiations are frequent (around 60%) and adjust contract values by small percentages. They respond mainly to exogenous shocks like COVID-19 or war rather than opportunism. Contracts overseen by regional/local authorities exhibit higher renegotiation prevalence.
• Performance comparison: PPPs perform similarly to traditional procurement in delivery (on-time, cost goals) but face selection bias. Their success depends on clear contracts with appropriate risk allocation and strong contracting authority capacity (available evidence limited).

4 Data on Renegotiations and Risk Management within the EU

• EU-wide renegotiation data: Using TED notices, 77,677 renegotiations observed (2016-2023) affecting €100 billion in contract values. This highlights variations in renegotiation practices across European countries (e.g., France, Italy vs. Spain, Bulgaria).
• Contract type differentials: Renegotiations are most frequent in service concession contracts with substantial impacts. Infrastructure concessions show medium frequency but larger value adjustments. Availability-based contracts and traditional public procurement demonstrate less renegotiation.
• Sentiment analysis: Renegotiations were generally perceived positively (mean sentiment score +0.73 across dictionaries). This supports the idea that renegotiation enhances contract flexibility and aligns with stakeholder interests.

5 Policy Recommendations

• Balancing flexibility with commitment: Design contracts to allow for renegotiation but maintain accountability mechanisms, using specialized PPP agencies to manage relational contracts efficiently.
• Improving data transparency: Diversify methods to capture informal renegotiation data alongside official sources like TED. Standardize ESG criteria and reporting for infrastructure PPPs.
• Renegotiation framework: Facilitate transparent, pre-defined renegotiation mechanisms that respond quickly to unexpected events (e.g., climate-related disruptions).Empirical evidence suggests PPPs can reduce costs in high-debt countries and complex sectors but require robust governance.
• Financial structure simplification: Encourage de-consolidation via explicit guarantees or tailored financing instruments, reducing project-level transaction costs and optimizing resource usage.

Conclusion

Private participation through PPPs offers a strategic avenue for addressing funding shortfalls and infrastructure gaps, but successful implementation necessitates proper contract engineering, transparent renegotiation protocols, and specialized institutional oversight. The interplay between public budgetary limits and private sector efficiency requires further empirical investigation and tailored policy design to optimize outcomes across diverse economic contexts.