2008年-世界发展银行全球_Household_Investment_under_Violence_-_The_Colombian_Case_49页_479kb

Summary: Household Investment under Violence – The Colombian Case

Core Content

This working paper by Rebekka E. Grun explores how violence in Colombia affects household investment decisions, particularly the allocation between fixed and mobile assets. It argues that households adjust their investment behavior in response to different types of violence, such as guerrilla or paramilitary activities (public order problems) and common delinquency (property crimes). The paper uses a rich Colombian micro-data set to test the hypothesis that households reduce overall investment and shift it towards more mobile assets when exposed to public order threats, while they may prefer fixed assets under conditions of higher common delinquency.

Main Views

• Violence and Investment Behavior: Households in rural Colombia face various forms of violence, including guerrilla and paramilitary threats, gang violence, and property crimes. These threats influence their consumption, savings, and investment decisions.
• Asset Vulnerability: Fixed assets (e.g., houses, land, appliances) are more vulnerable to public order problems, which include displacement and kidnapping, whereas mobile assets (e.g., bicycles, jewelry, transportable goods) are more susceptible to theft and mugging associated with common delinquency.
• Portfolio Adjustments: The paper suggests that households may shift their investment from fixed to mobile assets in response to public order violence, and vice versa in the case of common delinquency.
• Economic Implications: The long-term effects of violence on household savings and investment can be more damaging than the immediate loss of capital, as it may reduce the overall savings rate and shift resources to less productive assets.
• Theoretical Framework: The study employs a two-asset model where households are risk-averse and make intertemporal decisions. It shows that a decrease in the probability of success for fixed assets (e.g., due to displacement threats) leads to a higher demand for mobile assets.

Key Information

Types of Violence in Colombia

• Public Order Problems: These are threats from guerrillas and paramilitaries that aim to undermine the state, leading to displacement, attacks, and kidnappings.
• Common Delinquency: This includes property crimes such as muggings, looting, and homicides, typically carried out by local gangs.
• Impact on Society: Violence is widespread and has significant consequences for household safety and economic stability. Colombia has one of the highest homicide rates globally and high levels of common delinquency.

Data and Methodology

• Data Sources: The study uses the Familias en Acción baseline survey, which includes 11,500 households across 122 municipalities in Colombia.
• Variables: The dataset includes variables such as the incidence of public order problems, guerrilla attacks, homicide rates, and the capture rate under the Drug Act. It also includes municipality-level characteristics such as geography, judicial efficiency, and welfare indicators.
• Asset Classification: Assets are divided into fixed and mobile. Fixed assets are those that are difficult or impossible to move, while mobile assets are more easily transportable.
• Correlation Matrix: The paper presents a correlation matrix showing the relationship between violence and welfare indicators, highlighting the negative correlation between the capture rate and various violence measures, suggesting police responsiveness.

Empirical Findings

• High Incidence of Violence: Most municipalities experience high levels of violence, with a significant proportion of households affected by guerrilla attacks and common delinquency.
• Asset Sensitivity to Violence: The study finds that households are more likely to shift towards mobile assets when exposed to public order threats, and towards fixed assets when common delinquency is high.
• Data Limitations: While the data provides valuable insights, there are limitations, including the underreporting of certain delinquent activities and the lack of reliable measures for paramilitary actions.

Conclusion

The paper concludes that the economic impact of violence is not only immediate but also long-term, as it alters the investment and savings behavior of households. By analyzing the composition of household portfolios, it highlights the importance of understanding the differential impact of various types of violence on economic decisions. The findings suggest that policy responses to violence should consider these behavioral adjustments to mitigate their economic consequences.