2011年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Guatemala_Ex_31页_1mb

Summary of Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access Under the 2009 Stand-By Arrangement for Guatemala

Core Content

The Ex Post Evaluation of the 2009 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for Guatemala, conducted by the IMF staff in July 2011, assessed the effectiveness of the program in light of the global financial crisis. The SBA, with access of SDR 630.6 million (300 percent of quota), was approved as a precautionary measure to safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability, anchor investor confidence, and provide a cushion against potential external shocks. The evaluation concluded that the program's primary objectives were met, and the implementation was strong, despite some structural vulnerabilities that remained unaddressed.

Main Objectives of the SBA

• Safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability
• Anchor investor confidence
• Provide a cushion against the potential adverse effects of a worsening external environment

Key Findings

I. Introduction and Summary

• Guatemala faced significant downside risks in 2009 due to the global financial crisis and its impact on trading partners, particularly the United States.
• The SBA was approved in March 2009 as a precautionary measure, with the goal of addressing these risks.
• The program's primary objective was achieved, with all quantitative performance criteria (PCs) met.
• The external financing requirement was lower than expected, and the program did not need to be used for its full access.
• Some vulnerabilities, such as the banking system's legal and prudential framework, tax reform, and domestic arrears, were not fully addressed.

II. Overview of Developments Prior to the 2009 Program

• Guatemala had made substantial progress in macroeconomic stability and structural reforms before the 2009 crisis.
• The economy was growing at a high rate (5.5 percent annually in 2006-07), with a moderate current account deficit and high net international reserves (NIR).
• The authorities had planned to implement a tax reform to increase revenue, but it was not enacted due to political resistance.
• The global financial crisis began to impact Guatemala early, with a decline in remittances and private capital flows, especially foreign direct investment (FDI).
• The external financing requirement for 2009 was estimated at 16 percent of GDP, with significant rollover risks in the corporate sector.

III. Program Design and Exceptional Access Policy

A. Assessment of Program Design

• The program was designed to address the expected external financing needs and was considered a high-access precautionary SBA.
• The conditionality was streamlined, focusing on short-term macroeconomic performance and financial stability, with minimal emphasis on structural reforms.
• The quantitative performance criteria (PCs) were applied to the central government's overall balance, NIR, and external arrears.
• A consultation clause on inflation was included, and the conditionality was focused on strengthening the banking sector.
• The program did not include conditionality on tax reform, which was a key structural vulnerability.
• The staff considered that the program's design was coherent and appropriate, though it could have been improved in some areas.

B. Exceptional Access Policy

• The program was consistent with the Fund's policy on exceptional access.
• The Fund's financing strategy was appropriate, and the SBA proved a valuable preventive instrument.
• The high-access SBA was used to provide a cushion against potential external shocks, which did not materialize as severely as expected.

Main Views and Recommendations

• The program's implementation was strong, and the external environment was more favorable than anticipated.
• The authorities were committed to sound macroeconomic policies, and the SBA helped reinforce this credibility.
• The fiscal stimulus was moderate and financed largely through external sources to avoid crowding out the private sector.
• The monetary policy was anchored in an inflation targeting (IT) framework, and the central bank was committed to maintaining flexibility in exchange rates while managing volatility.
• The financial sector policies were appropriate and aimed at strengthening the regulatory and supervisory framework, improving the safety net, and enhancing resolution procedures.
• The program's focus on the banking sector was well-aligned with the authorities' efforts and the Fund's recommendations.
• The lack of progress in tax reform and the persistence of domestic arrears were significant concerns.
• The evaluation recommended that the authorities continue to prioritize eliminating these vulnerabilities, including through tax reform and improving budgetary control.

Key Information

• External Financing Requirements: The baseline scenario projected a large external financing requirement of US$6.2 billion (16.2 percent of GDP), but the actual need was lower.
• Tax-to-GDP Ratio: Guatemala's tax-to-GDP ratio remains among the lowest in Latin America, with a target of 13.25 percent from the 1996 Peace Accords.
• Tax Reforms: The authorities had planned tax reforms to increase revenue, but political resistance and lack of legislative support prevented their enactment.
• Fiscal Deficit: The program allowed for a higher fiscal deficit in 2009, primarily due to increased social spending and a cyclical decline in revenues.
• Monetary Policy: The central bank was committed to inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate regime, with an intervention rule to limit volatility.
• Banking Sector Reforms: The program included measures to strengthen the banking sector, including regulatory amendments and improved resolution procedures.
• Program Performance: The program was successful in achieving its primary objectives, and the macroeconomic performance was relatively strong.

Conclusion

The SBA was an appropriate and effective precautionary measure that helped safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability in Guatemala during the global financial crisis. The program was well-designed and aligned with Fund policies, though there were opportunities for improvement, particularly in the area of structural reforms. The evaluation concluded that the authorities should continue to address remaining vulnerabilities, such as the low tax-to-GDP ratio and weak budgetary control, to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability and economic resilience.