战略与国际研究中心-OPCON-Transition-in-Korea_5页_214kb

KOREA CHAIR PLATFORM: OPCON Transition in Korea

Core Content

The Korea Chair Platform, authored by General (Ret) Walter Sharp, discusses the ongoing debate between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States regarding the transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK by December 1, 2015. This is the third such discussion, with previous ones in 2006 and 2010. The document outlines the current command structures, the proposed transition plan, alternative structures, and the arguments for and against the transition.

Current Command Structures in Korea

• ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS): The top warfighting command on the ROK side, responsible for the day-to-day defense of the country. It holds OPCON over all ROK forces, including those patrolling the DMZ and conducting air and naval patrols.
• U.S. Command Structures:
  • USFK (United States Forces Korea): Commands U.S. troops in Korea, focusing on training and readiness for potential war scenarios. It does not conduct direct warfighting operations.
  • Combined Forces Command (CFC): A combined headquarters with U.S. and ROK personnel, responsible for training and deterrence. It becomes the warfighting headquarters during a crisis.
  • United Nations Command (UNC): Oversees the enforcement of the 1953 Armistice Agreement and coordinates multinational forces during a war.

Current Plan for OPCON Transition on 1 Dec 2015

• CFC Dissolution: CFC would be dissolved, and ROK JCS would take over the defense of the ROK at all times.
• KORCOM Formation: A new U.S. headquarters, KORCOM, would be established. It would replace USFK in its Title 10 role and act as the U.S. "supporting" headquarters to ROK JCS.
• OPCON Transition: U.S. forces would still be under the command of the U.S. four-star general (KORCOM commander), but this command would fall under the ROK CJCS during wartime.
• UNC Role: UNC's role remains unchanged, focusing on enforcing the Armistice and coordinating multinational forces.

Alternatives Being Examined

1. Status Quo: Maintain the current CFC structure and delay OPCON transition indefinitely. The ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) has advocated for this.
2. Transition as Agreed: Proceed with the transition on 1 Dec 2015 as outlined in the 2010 Strategic Alliance 2015 Document.
3. CFC-ROK Structure: A hybrid model where CFC is restructured with a ROK four-star general as the commander and a U.S. four-star as deputy. This would maintain a combined command structure and allow for more effective coordination.

Pros and Cons of Each Alternative

Arguments for Keeping the Current Structure

• Proven Success: The current structure has deterred war for over 60 years.
• Combined Command: A combined command is more effective than a supporting-supported relationship.
• U.S. Commitment: The U.S. remains committed under the Mutual Defense Treaty, and transitioning OPCON does not reduce this commitment.
• Readiness of ROK: ROK leadership is capable and ready to command in a war scenario.

Arguments for Transitioning on 1 Dec 2015

• National Sovereignty: The ROK is capable of defending itself and should take responsibility.
• Deterrence: A ROK-led command signals strength and professionalism, further deterring North Korea.
• Increased ROK Defense Spending: Transition may incentivize the ROK to invest more in defense systems like ISR, missile defense, and next-gen fighters.
• Cost and Readiness: The transition has been planned and resourced, and delaying it would incur additional costs.

Arguments for CFC-ROK Structure

• Maintains Combined Command: Ensures continued coordination and effectiveness.
• Stability During Crisis: Avoids the need for mid-crisis reorganization.
• Better Understanding of Provocations: A combined command allows the U.S. to better understand and respond to ROK provocations.

My Recommendations

1. Transition OPCON to ROK by 1 Dec 2015: The ROK is capable and ready to take on this responsibility.
2. Adopt the CFC-ROK Structure: Maintain a combined command with a ROK general as commander to ensure effectiveness and continuity.
3. Reaffirm U.S. Commitment: The U.S. should maintain at least 28,500 troops in Korea for the foreseeable future, including a significant number stationed for three years to ensure continuity.
4. Clarify U.S. Force Contributions: Clearly outline the forces the U.S. will provide under each Combined OPLAN to ensure readiness and support.

Key Information

• General Sharp has extensive experience in military command, including roles in the U.S. Army and international operations.
• The transition of OPCON is a critical aspect of the U.S.-ROK alliance, affecting command structures and military readiness.
• The Strategic Alliance 2015 Document outlines the conditions for a successful transition.
• The Korea Chair Platform is published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and supported by Samsung Electronics America.

Conclusion

The document emphasizes the importance of transitioning wartime OPCON to the ROK as a step towards greater national sovereignty and a more effective alliance. It advocates for a combined command structure led by the ROK to ensure stability and readiness, while reaffirming the U.S. commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty and maintaining a strong military presence in Korea.