【美国能源部】2024年电池储能系统报告_91页_2mb

Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) Report Summary

Overview of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS)

BESS are critical components in modernizing the U.S. energy grid, providing essential services like frequency regulation, energy arbitrage, and grid stabilization. The U.S. Department of Energy's Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and other federal programs are driving grid digitization, but challenges include limited domestic supply chain capacity and geopolitical risks, particularly from foreign entities like China. BESS is expected to grow significantly, with projections indicating up to 200 GW of capacity by 2050, mostly from lithium-ion batteries, supporting renewable energy integration and grid resilience. However, this growth is threatened by cybersecurity risks and supply chain dependencies on foreign-manufactured components, which dominate key parts like inverters and battery cells.

Current Status and Growth Projections

The U.S. energy storage market has expanded rapidly, with 4 GW of new installations in 2023 and a forecasted doubling of capacity by 2024–2025. California leads BESS deployment, with over 5 GW of active capacity as of May 2023, used for frequency regulation and emergency response during events like heatwaves. Texas and Hawaii are also seeing BESS applications for grid stability, peak shaving, and renewable integration. Projections show a 23-fold decrease in energy prices by 2050, with stationary storage reaching 1,000 GWh by 2030. Despite this, interconnection delays and supply chain issues are slowing project deployment, with designs matured over years.

Supply Chain and Cybersecurity Risks

The BESS supply chain is dominated by foreign companies, with over 70% of inverter and 100% of battery cells sourced from China, raising concerns about national security and foreign influence. Foreign entities like China are involved in manufacturing, potentially introducing vulnerabilities through compromised components or backdoors. Cyber threats are exacerbating these risks, with vulnerabilities found in power converters, battery management systems (BMS), and software, allowing unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or system misoperation. Key threats include nation-state actors, malware (e.g., Mirai botnet), and supply chain attacks, leading to potential grid instability. Mitigation requires robust supply chain audits, secure-by-design practices, and enhanced monitoring.

Technical Components and Functions

BESS architecture includes cell modules, battery packs, power conversion systems (PCS), inverters, BMS, and energy management systems (EMS). Functions span frequency and voltage regulation, energy arbitrage, load following, and black start capabilities. Critical components like PCS and inverters are highly exposed to cyber risks due to their control roles, while BMS focuses on battery health monitoring and fire prevention. Technical solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE), which integrates cybersecurity into design, and improved standards like IEEE 1547.3 and UL 2941 for safety and interoperability. Addressing these requires strengthening domestic manufacturing and component resilience.

Regional Case Studies

• California: BESS played a vital role in 2022 heatwaves, providing substantial regulation and emergency power through projects like CAISO's 5 GW capacity. The state uses a Non-Generator Resource (NGR) model, allowing BESS to function as both generation and load, enhancing grid flexibility.
• Hawaii: A 185 MW BESS project replaced coal power, showcasing renewable goals and grid support, but faced challenges with deployment and safety incidents.
• Texas: Solar eclipses and other events highlighted BESS's importance in bridging renewable intermittency, but extreme heat caused operational issues, leading to software updates.

Mitigation Strategies and Recommendations

Short-term strategies include rip-and-replace programs for existing systems, contract enforcement for component cybersecurity, and enhanced monitoring. Long-term solutions involve building a domestic supply chain through initiatives like the CHIPS Act and Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, promoting U.S.-based manufacturing for critical components. Policies enforced by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) aim to ban foreign entities, though challenges like high costs and supplier resistance persist. Technical measures include Secure by Design frameworks, vulnerability assessments, and consequence-driven prioritization of critical components. DOE programs like Cyber Informed Engineering and CyTRICS support research and deployment of secure BESS. Collaboration between government, industry, and stakeholders is essential for resilient energy infrastructure.

Conclusion

The report concludes that BESS is indispensable for grid stability and energy transition, but supply chain and security risks must be addressed. Prioritized, innovative strategies can mitigate vulnerabilities, ensuring reliable operation amidst growing geopolitical and cyber threats. Continued investment in domestic manufacturing and cybersecurity will foster a secure, resilient energy future.