2014年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Canada_Report_on_the_Observance_of_Standards_and_Codes_67页_693kb

Canada: Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (January 2014)

Core Content Overview

This report provides an assessment of Canada's compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCPs), Insurance Core Principles (ICPs), and the IOSCO Principles and Objectives of Securities Regulation. It was prepared by the IMF's Monetary and Capital Markets Department during a standards assessment mission in Canada in 2013.

Key Findings on Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision

Core Principle 1: Responsibilities, Objectives, and Powers

• OSFI has the sole legal mandate for banking supervision in Canada.
• The Bank Act provides OSFI with broad powers essential for effective supervision.
• The Act includes a mandatory five-year revision cycle, ensuring it remains current with financial system needs.

Core Principle 2: Independence, Accountability, Resourcing, and Legal Protection

• OSFI operates with operational independence, though its structure is subject to governmental oversight via the Minister of Finance.
• The Bank Act should be revised to clearly distinguish OSFI's and Superintendent's prudential responsibilities from the Minister's broader considerations.
• A prudential veto mechanism should be established for decisions involving change of control or major acquisitions by federally regulated banks.

Core Principle 3: Cooperation and Collaboration

• OSFI maintains cohesive cooperation with other federal and international regulatory bodies.
• While federal cooperation is strong and effective, provincial coordination is less developed and represents a potential systemic frailty.
• Information sharing with provincial regulators is crucial for full compliance and should be enhanced.

Core Principle 4: Permissible Activities

• Banks in Canada are federally incorporated and regulated, and cannot exist at the provincial level.
• The BCPs assessment focuses on federal level supervision and does not cover provincial deposit-taking entities.
• The federal system does not include all systemically significant deposit-taking institutions, such as Desjardins and Alberta Treasury Branches.

Core Principle 5: Licensing Criteria

• Licensing is a two-step process involving OSFI and the Minister.
• OSFI has the authority to make a prudential determination before the Minister’s approval is sought.
• Ongoing supervision does not include regular fit and proper assessments of new directors and senior management.

Core Principle 6: Transfer of Significant Ownership

• Banks must submit an annual "Return of Shareholders", but it often fails to identify ultimate beneficial owners.
• There is no legal requirement for banks to notify OSFI of material adverse changes in major shareholders or controllers.
• This poses risks, particularly for smaller institutions, and could be addressed through enhanced transparency.

Core Principle 7: Major Acquisitions

• The Bank Act sets clear prudential limits and Ministerial approval requirements for major acquisitions.
• OSFI performs the prudential assessment and recommends approval to the Minister.
• No approval is required for acquisitions via foreign or provincial subsidiaries, which may expose the system to regulatory divergence.

Core Principle 8: Supervisory Approach

• OSFI uses a "close touch" approach, emphasizing risk-based, proportionate supervision.
• The approach is forward-looking, with tools like intervention ratings and stages of supervisory intensity to communicate expectations.

Core Principle 9: Supervisory Techniques and Tools

• OSFI maintains high standards of supervision and is perceived as accessible and willing to engage with the industry.
• Its close touch approach leads to effective outcomes but may risk loss of momentum if not managed carefully.

Core Principle 10: Supervisory Reporting

• OSFI receives standard prudential data and management information from banks.
• Gaps exist in large exposures and related party lending data.
• OSFI makes financial data publicly available on its website.

Core Principle 11: Corrective and Sanctioning Powers

• OSFI has comprehensive corrective and sanctioning powers under the Bank Act.
• It employs a structured intervention approach with increasing intensity based on the severity of issues.
• Staging is used to enforce corrective actions, but the process can be slow, requiring pressure to ensure timely resolution.

Core Principle 12: Consolidated Supervision

• OSFI has a strong legal and regulatory framework for consolidated supervision.
• It emphasizes risk distribution across groups, internal controls, and information flow.
• It goes beyond Basel by requiring solo entity information for systemic banking groups, though focus is on significant activities rather than individual banks.

Core Principle 13: Home-Host Relationships

• OSFI plays a more significant role as a home supervisor than a host supervisor.
• It monitors Canadian banks abroad and allocates resources accordingly.
• Home-host relationships are strong in areas with significant Canadian presence, but less so in group-level activities.

Core Principle 14: Corporate Governance

• OSFI has a comprehensive corporate governance supervision program.
• It maintains regular contact with directors and has a centralized unit for governance oversight.

Core Principle 15: Risk Management Process

• OSFI's risk management supervision is high quality, with rigorous analysis and peer comparisons.
• It operates at a principles-based level, but could benefit from more detailed and consistent written guidance across all risk areas.
• Guidelines and advisories are somewhat inconsistent, and some risk areas are under-covered.

Core Principle 16: Capital Adequacy

• OSFI takes a proactive and conservative approach to capital adequacy.
• It fully adopts Basel II and III and has accelerated implementation timelines for banks.
• Leverage ratio requirements are retained to ensure solvency and stability.

Main Recommendations

• Amend the Bank Act to secure prudential veto powers for the Superintendent.
• Improve information sharing with provincial regulators to enhance systemic coordination.
• Strengthen ownership transparency and notification requirements for material changes.
• Ensure consistency and comprehensiveness in risk management guidance.
• Enhance reporting standards for large exposures and related party lending.
• Improve legal clarity and separation of roles between OSFI, the Superintendent, and the Minister.
• Expand consolidated supervision to include legal entity-level scrutiny in recovery and resolution planning.

Conclusion

Canada demonstrates a high level of compliance with the Basel Core Principles, with OSFI being a leading regulatory authority in the field of banking supervision. While operational independence is well established, there are areas for improvement, particularly in legal clarity, inter-jurisdictional coordination, and risk management consistency. The report emphasizes the need for reforms to enhance transparency, systemic resilience, and international alignment with regulatory standards.