2012年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Spain_Report_on_the_Observance_of_Standards_and_Codes_Summary_Assessments_60页_692kb

Spain: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes – Summary Assessment (May 2012)

Core Content

This document is a summary assessment of the implementation of the Basel Core Principles (BCPs), Insurance Core Principles (ICPs), and IOSCO Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation in Spain. It was prepared as part of an IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) update in February 2012 and reflects the regulatory and supervisory framework in place at that time.

Main Findings

Banking Supervision (BCPs)

• Economic and Sectoral Context: Spain was experiencing the collapse of a real estate bubble, with construction and real estate loans reaching 43% of GDP in 2009 and still around 37% in 2011. This led to significant financial stress, particularly in the savings bank (Caja) sector, which was heavily exposed to real estate and construction.
• Sector Restructuring: The number of Caja institutions was reduced from 45 to 18 through mergers, takeovers, and interventions. Most Cajas had transferred their banking activities to commercial banks, though their governance structures retained some characteristics.
• Supervisory Framework: The Banco de España (BdE) is the main banking supervisor, with some regional oversight retained by the Autonomous Communities (CCAAs). The BdE has strong supervisory processes, supported by experienced staff and inspectors, but there are concerns regarding the timeliness and effectiveness of resolution actions.
• Legal and Regulatory Setting: The legal framework for transparency and governance of publicly traded institutions has improved, with financial statements required to be prepared in accordance with IFRS for consolidated reports and domestic Spanish standards for individual reports. The BdE has delegated authority from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MoE) to set accounting standards for banks.
• Resolution Framework: The BdE, FROB, and MoE share responsibilities in bank resolution. However, the process lacks the ability to fully allocate losses to shareholders and creditors, and the resolution is often convoluted. The FROB, a state-backed recapitalization fund, plays a key role in reorganization and financial support, but its powers are limited in some respects.
• Challenges: The BdE lacks the authority to issue prudential regulations independently, which limits its ability to address systemic risks early. The presence of MoE in the governance structure and the sharing of enforcement responsibilities also raises concerns about operational independence. Additionally, the legal framework for managing concentration risk and related party transactions is insufficient, especially in the context of the complex governance structures of savings banks.

Insurance Supervision (ICPs)

• Supervisory Bodies: The Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones (DGSFP) is responsible for insurance and pension fund supervision, while the BdE and CNMV oversee other aspects of the financial system.
• Legal and Regulatory Setting: The insurance sector is regulated by the Insurance Core Principles (ICPs), and there has been progress in improving compliance with these principles. However, there are still areas for improvement, particularly in the enforcement of internal controls and risk management practices.
• Authorities' Response: The authorities have implemented reforms to strengthen corporate governance, manage conflicts of interest, and improve the functioning of securities settlement systems. However, the effectiveness of these measures is still under scrutiny.

Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles)

• Regulatory Bodies: The Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) oversees securities markets, while the BdE is responsible for payments and settlements systems.
• Legal and Regulatory Setting: The legal framework for securities regulation has been strengthened, with the CNMV playing a central role in ensuring transparency and investor protection.
• Authorities' Response: The authorities have made efforts to improve the implementation of IOSCO principles, including enhanced coordination between regulators and improved oversight of concentration risk and related party transactions.

Key Recommendations

• Enhance Prudential Regulation: The BdE should be granted greater authority to issue prudential regulations independently to better address systemic risks.
• Improve Enforcement Mechanisms: The BdE should have more flexible and effective enforcement tools to ensure timely corrective actions.
• Strengthen Independence: The legal framework should be reformed to ensure greater independence for the BdE, particularly in its supervisory role.
• Address Concentration Risk: More rigorous oversight of concentration risk and related party transactions is needed, especially in the context of the new commercial banks formed from the restructuring of Cajas.
• Improve Risk Management: The BdE should enhance the monitoring and control of risk management processes, particularly in the context of the ongoing crisis.

Authorities' Response

• The Spanish authorities have taken steps to address many of the concerns raised in the assessment, including tightening regulatory capital and loan-loss provisioning requirements, improving corporate governance, and enhancing coordination between financial regulators.
• They have also implemented measures to reduce incentives for equity investments in nonfinancial companies by banks and to manage related conflicts of interest.
• The authorities have emphasized the need for a more flexible enforcement regime and the importance of timely corrective actions to prevent further financial instability.

Conclusion

The assessment highlights the significant progress made in Spain's financial sector regulation and supervision since the 2006 FSAP, particularly in the areas of transparency, governance, and risk management. However, it also identifies key areas for improvement, including the need for greater independence for the BdE, more effective enforcement mechanisms, and enhanced oversight of concentration risk and related party transactions. These recommendations aim to strengthen the resilience of the financial system and ensure that it can better withstand future economic shocks.