2011年-IMF国际货币组织全球_Russian_Federation_Targeted_Detailed_Assessment_of_Observance_of_Basel_Core_Principles_for_Effective_Banking_Supervision_104页_959kb

Russian Federation: Targeted Detailed Assessment of Observance of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (July 2011)

Core Content Overview

This report presents a targeted detailed assessment of the Russian Federation's compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCP) for Effective Banking Supervision, conducted in July 2011 based on information up to April 2011. It evaluates the supervisory framework, identifies key findings, and proposes an action plan to improve compliance. The assessment was carried out by Mr. José Tuya, a consultant, as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) Stability Module.

Main Findings

Improvement Since 2007 Assessment

• Some progress has been made in BCP compliance, but significant gaps remain.
• CP-9 on problem assets and provisioning was upgraded to "largely compliant."
• CP-11 on exposure to related parties was downgraded to "materially noncompliant."

Key Areas of Concern

Licensing and Structure (CP 5)

• The CBR Law does not require prior approval for domestic nonbank financial investments.
• Ex-post notification is required for over 1% share acquisitions, but this is insufficient for effective risk management.
• Rating: Materially Noncompliant (MNC)

Prudential Regulations and Requirements (CPs 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 18)

• Capital adequacy rules align with Basel II, Pillar 1, but Pillar 2 implementation is not yet possible due to lack of legal authority.
• CP-6: Largely Compliant (LC)
• CP-7: Largely Compliant (LC)
• CP-8: Largely Compliant (LC)
• CP-9: Largely Compliant (LC)
• CP-11: Materially Noncompliant (MNC)
• CP-12: Materially Noncompliant (MNC)
• CP-18: Largely Compliant (LC)

Corrective and Remedial Powers of Supervisors (CP 23)

• The CBR has broad enforcement powers, but lacks the ability to sanction individual directors and officers.
• Rating: Largely Compliant (LC)

Consolidated Supervision (CP 24)

• The CBR is unable to fully capture related parties and affiliates due to narrow legal definitions.
• Rating: Materially Noncompliant (MNC)

Key Issues Identified

• Legal Authority Deficiencies: The CBR lacks sufficient legal powers to enforce recommendations in key areas such as corporate governance, related party supervision, and consolidated supervision.
• Narrow Definitions of Related Parties: The current definition is based solely on legal relationships, not economic influence, limiting the CBR's ability to identify and manage risks.
• Insufficient Enforcement Tools: The CBR cannot sanction individual directors or impose limits on salaries and bonuses, nor can it require banks to implement ICAAP or set capital requirements based on risk.
• Transparency and Information Sharing: The CBR is restricted by privacy laws from sharing client information with other supervisors, both domestic and international.
• Need for Legislative Reforms: Amendments to the CBR Law and BL are pending in the Duma to enhance the supervisory framework, particularly in the areas of related party supervision, consolidated supervision, and enforcement of best practices.

Recommended Action Plan

Action Items

• Implement the 2015 Banking Sector Development Strategy to improve the supervisory framework.
• Enhance Accountability and Transparency by increasing CBR representation in the National Banking Council and securing stronger political support.
• Streamline Banking Regulations to make them more accessible and clear for both banks and supervisors.
• Strengthen Legal Powers for the CBR to use professional judgment in supervisory work.
• Provide Legal Protection for supervisors by establishing guidelines for financing legal defense in advance.
• Remove Legal Barriers to cross-border information exchange.
• Lower Shareholding Vetting Threshold from 20% to 10% to improve oversight of shareholders and board members.
• Require Ex-Ante CBR Approval for acquisitions of domestic nonbank financial institutions.
• Introduce Risk Management Regulations that strengthen board requirements and allow the CBR to issue governance-related regulations.
• Enhance Provisioning Standards to ensure adequate loan loss reserves.
• Improve Related Party Supervision by updating definitions and requiring lending on market terms.
• Extend CBR Supervisory Authority to bank holding companies and allow for consolidated information reporting.

Authorities' Response

• The CBR has acknowledged the findings and is working on legislative changes to address the identified deficiencies.
• The CBR has announced plans to seek additional legal authority for sanctioning individual directors and officers.
• Efforts are underway to improve transparency and financial reporting standards in the Russian banking sector.
• The CBR has already made progress in closing banks involved in money laundering and improving the overall stability of the system.

Summary of Compliance-Detailed Assessment

Conclusion

The Russian Federation has made some progress in implementing the Basel Core Principles, particularly in capital adequacy and risk management. However, critical deficiencies remain in areas such as related party supervision, consolidated supervision, and the enforcement of supervisory recommendations. Legislative reforms are essential to enhance the CBR's supervisory capabilities and align with international best practices. The CBR has shown a commitment to improving the framework and is actively working on the necessary changes.