巴德学院利维经济研究所-增长与纪律_股票流动一致性模型中的意大利财政困境（英）-2025.5_50页_832kb

Summary

• ABSTRACT:
  This paper evaluates the EU's revised fiscal governance framework (DSR) impact on Italy, which faces high public debt and economic stagnation. The study employs the Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) MITA model to simulate medium-term fiscal policy scenarios. It finds that while the EU framework aims to ensure debt stabilization and recovery, Italy's fiscal path under the revised rules leads to a steady rise in public debt-to-GDP ratio despite expectations of fiscal adjustment.

Key Findings

• The EU's Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) requires a specific expenditure path to reduce debt, but the study shows this path in the Medium-Term Fiscal-Structural Plan (MTSFP) does not achieve debt stabilization under the MITA model projections.

• Alternative fiscal policy scenarios demonstrate the trade-offs between fiscal consolidation and growth:

  • Contractionary Fiscal Policy: Reduces debt-to-GDP and improves fiscal balance short-term but leads to economic stagnation and loss of employment (similar to "austerity" policies).
  • Expansionary Fiscal Policy: Boosts growth and lowers unemployment but increases the debt burden due to deficits.
  • Mixed Policy: Balancing expansionary spending with higher taxes can lower the debt ratio and have fewer economic costs than purely contractionary policies but still faces challenges.

Policy Implications

• For debt reduction in economies with high public debt and low growth, tax hikes may be more effective than spending cuts, though socially costly.
• Alternative scenarios highlight the danger of fiscal rigidity; the EU framework may discourage needed growth-enhancing policy mixes.

Overall

• Italy's medium-term fiscal strategy, aligned with DSA and MTSFP, may be ineffective in reducing debt, reinforcing the need for a more flexible fiscal governance framework.

This summary captures the use of the MITA model, the impact of the EU fiscal rules on Italy, key simulation results, and policy recommendations.