战略与国际研究中心-The-Ongoing-Lessons-of-Armed-Nation-Building-In-Afghanistan-and-Iraq_99页_3mb

Summary of "The Ongoing Lessons of the Afghan and Iraq Wars"

Core Content

This document, authored by Anthony H. Cordesman and published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2008, provides an in-depth analysis of the lessons learned from the Afghan and Iraq Wars. It outlines strategic and operational challenges, the role of civil-military partnerships, and the necessity of integrating political, security, and development efforts to achieve long-term stability in conflict zones.

Main Views and Key Information

Strategic and Grand Strategic Lessons

• War vs. Containment: The document questions whether war is a better option than containment, deterrence, and diplomacy, emphasizing the need for honest evaluation of the costs and benefits.
• Cost of Military Engagement: The true cost of a military engagement must be considered, including time, resources, and the potential for escalation.
• Civil-Military Resources: The availability of necessary civil-military resources is crucial for success, and the host country must be able to develop its own security and governance capabilities.
• Exit Strategy: A realistic exit strategy is essential, and the cost of defeat must be weighed against the risks of prolonged conflict.
• Integrated Approach: The war must be conducted as an integrated civil-military operation, with a focus on building local capacity and understanding the complex internal fault lines.

Conducting the War

• Limit the War: The war should be kept limited, with the ability to withdraw if it goes sour.
• Early Commitment: Adequate military, civilian, aid, and advisory resources must be committed from the beginning.
• Jointness: Joint operations must integrate all aspects of the campaign, including security, governance, and development.
• Local Engagement: The local and regional level of operations is as important as the central government in achieving success.
• Focus on the Enemy: Understanding and addressing ethnic, sectarian, and tribal divisions is critical to counterinsurgency success.

The Four Elements of Victory in a Joint Campaign Plan

• Political Accommodation: Building political trust and cooperation is a priority.
• Security: Ensuring security is a foundational element, especially in areas with good governance.
• Governance: Strengthening governance and providing essential services is integral to security.
• Development: Sustainable development is necessary to support long-term stability and reduce the appeal of insurgent groups.

Afghanistan vs. Iraq

• Afghanistan:

  • Land area: 647,500 sq km
  • Population: 31.9 million, 28% literacy
  • Economy: Landlocked, agrarian, GDP ~$35B, PCI ~$1,000
  • Infrastructure: Limited transportation and information systems
  • Terrain: Restrictive and challenging
  • Ethnic Composition: 80% Sunni, 19% Shi’a, 1% Other
  • Tribal Challenges: Fragmented and rural

• Iraq:

  • Land area: 432,162 sq km
  • Population: 27.5 million, 84% literacy
  • Economy: Oil-dominated, GDP ~$100B, PCI ~$3,600
  • Infrastructure: Better developed
  • Ethnic Composition: 60-65% Shi’a, 32-37% Sunni, 3% Christian or Other
  • Political Accommodation: Required for long-term stability

Key Surge Operations

• What Went Right:

  • US build-up to 20 brigades
  • Tactical shift to forward deployment
  • Surge in airpower and ground forces
  • Iraqi government support for operations against both Sunni and Shi’ite extremists
  • Expansion of partner units and embeds
  • Focus on Baghdad

• What Went Wrong:

  • Lack of political accommodation
  • Insufficient progress in rule of law and governance
  • Limited impact of US civilian role and aid
  • Slow development and employment
  • Intra-Shi’ite tensions and Iranian influence
  • Failure to address Arab-Kurdish-Turkish tensions

• After the Surge:

  • Reduction in uncertainties of a long war
  • Political accommodation between Sunni-Shi'a and Arab-Kurd
  • Stable autonomy for Kurds
  • Open list and air elections
  • Effective governance and services
  • Resolution of petroleum and budget issues
  • Strengthening ties with neighbors

Tactical Lessons

• Adequate Forces: Sufficient military forces are essential for success.
• Forward Deployment: The "win, hold, and build" approach is necessary at the local level.
• Local Forces: Building and integrating local forces is a critical force multiplier.
• HUMINT: Encouraging local intelligence is vital for counterinsurgency.
• Detainee Problem: Solving this issue is crucial for maintaining legitimacy.
• Targeting: Careful targeting and minimizing civilian casualties is essential.
• C4I Interface: Effective land-air coordination is necessary to avoid friendly fire.
• All-Weather and All-Terrain Capability: These are valuable assets in combat.

Air Power and Logistics

• Combat Sorties: There was a significant increase in air combat missions, especially in Afghanistan.
• Air Support: Air support, including CAS and strike sorties, was more effective when combined with ground forces and HUMINT.
• Airlift and Air Drops: Airlift and air drops played a critical role in logistics, especially in areas with poor infrastructure and terrain.

Host Country Force Development

• Iraq Security Forces Expenditures:

  • Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces:

    • Iraqi Police Service: 288,001 authorized, 275,300 assigned, 155,248 trained
    • National Police: 33,670 authorized, 32,389 assigned, 41,399 trained
    • Border Enforcement: 38,205 authorized, 39,649 assigned, 27,959 trained
    • Total MoI: 359,876 authorized, 347,338 assigned, 224,606 trained

  • Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forces:

    • Army: 186,352 authorized, 159,938 assigned, 174,940 trained
    • Support Forces: 17,369 authorized, 18,794 assigned, 19,750 trained
    • Air Force: 2,907 authorized, 1,305 assigned, 1,370 trained
    • Navy: 1,483 authorized, 1,115 assigned, 1,194 trained
    • Total MoD: 208,111 authorized, 181,152 assigned, 197,254 trained

  • Counter Terrorism Bureau:

    • Special Operations: 4,857 authorized, 3,126 assigned, 3,485 trained
    • Total Iraqi Security Forces: 572,844 authorized, 531,616 assigned, 425,345 trained

Conclusion

The document emphasizes that counterinsurgency is a complex and multifaceted endeavor, requiring not only military strength but also political, economic, and social engagement. It highlights the importance of understanding and addressing the internal dynamics of the region, the necessity of a comprehensive and integrated approach, and the critical role of local partnerships and governance in achieving lasting stability.