战略与国际研究中心-Shape,-Clear,-Hold,-and-Build_103页_3mb

Summary of "Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build: The Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan and Iraq Wars"

Core Content

This report by Anthony H. Cordesman, from the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, analyzes the strategic and operational lessons from the U.S. and coalition involvement in the Afghan and Iraq Wars. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the complex political, cultural, and economic dynamics of the host countries and highlights the need for a comprehensive and sustainable approach to counterinsurgency and nation-building.

Main Views

Strategic Lessons

• Valid Goals: Wars must have clear, achievable, and legitimate strategic objectives.
• Escalation Risk: Limited wars can escalate in intensity, duration, and strategic commitment.
• Host Country Dynamics: Understanding the host country's internal political, ethnic, and religious structures is essential.
• War Termination Goals: Accurate assessment of end goals is critical; focus on long-term strategic outcomes rather than short-term kinetic victories.
• Stability Operations: Adequate resources for stability operations are necessary; otherwise, the mission may fail.
• Coalition Building: Effective coalitions are required for long-term success, not just short-term political considerations.
• Resource Allocation: Inadequate resources lead to failure; the U.S. and coalition must be prepared to commit sufficient resources.
• Civil Side of War: Civil-military integration is vital. The population and governance are the center of gravity, not military operations.
• Strategic Patience: The U.S. and Western patience is limited and dependent on visible progress.
• Cultural and Political Factors: National culture and political dynamics will reassert themselves over time, and Western concepts of governance and law may not be applicable.
• Disenfranchised Populations: Unemployed or marginalized youth are a significant risk for insurgent recruitment.
• Occupation and Sovereignty: Occupation alienates populations, and a credible transfer to local leadership and full sovereignty is necessary for success.

Afghanistan Case

• Initial Success: The Taliban and Al Qa’ida were initially shattered and could not recover.
• Military Operations: The U.S. and coalition forces had a relatively small presence, with ~49,000 troops.
• Security Forces: Afghan security forces were not a priority, and the focus was on political and governance reforms.
• Civilian Engagement: Civilian agencies and local leaders were involved in delivering aid and services.
• Regional Dynamics: Pakistan played a key role, but its involvement in harboring insurgents was a concern.
• Infrastructure and Governance: Limited infrastructure and low literacy levels posed challenges, but the focus was on political and economic development.
• Security and Stability: The "shape, clear, hold, and build" strategy was applied, with an emphasis on separating insurgents from the population and building trust through security and development.
• Civilian Casualties: Insurgent attacks caused a significant number of civilian casualties, with a growing trend in kinetic events.
• Security Forces Development: Afghan security forces (ANSF) were to be built up to eventually take over from coalition forces.

Iraq Case

• Justification for War: The invasion was justified by the WMD programs and Saddam's ties to terrorism.
• Initial Reception: The U.S. and coalition were initially welcomed as liberators, but this changed over time.
• Stability and Reconstruction: Iraq had the resources (oil wealth) to fund its own reconstruction, but lacked effective governance.
• Internal Divisions: Sectarian, ethnic, and religious divisions were significant, but not insurmountable.
• Political Legitimacy: A new constitution and democratic elections were seen as key to stabilizing Iraq.
• Security Forces: Iraqi security forces could be disbanded without major political consequences, but building up effective forces was not a priority.
• U.S. Influence: U.S. influence declined, and many Iraqis wanted the U.S. to leave.
• Regional Impact: The actions of Pakistan, Iran, and other regional actors were critical to the success in Afghanistan.

Key Information

• Troop Levels: Afghanistan had ~49,000 coalition forces, while Iraq had ~176,000.
• Civilian Casualties: In 2009, civilian casualties in Afghanistan rose significantly, with suicide and IED attacks being the main cause.
• Security Force Development: The ANSF was to be built up over time, but progress was slow and inconsistent.
• Strategic Communication: A coordinated strategic communication campaign was needed to counter insurgent narratives.
• Long-Term Challenges: Both countries faced long-term challenges such as ethnic divisions, corruption, and lack of economic opportunity.
• Exit Strategies: The U.S. lacked a clear exit strategy and operational civil and economic plans.
• Regional Dynamics: The role of neighboring countries, especially Pakistan, was crucial to the stability of Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The report underscores the necessity of a holistic, culturally sensitive, and resource-intensive approach to counterinsurgency and nation-building. It stresses that military success is only possible if it is accompanied by effective governance, economic development, and civil-military coordination. The U.S. and its allies must understand the limitations of their influence and the importance of local ownership and sustainability in post-conflict environments.