战略与国际研究中心-Developments-in-Iraq-at-the-End-of-2003_12页_109kb

Summary of Developments in Iraq at the End of 2003

Core Content

The document, Developments in Iraq at the End of 2003: Adapting US Policy to Stay the Course by Anthony H. Cordesman, provides an analysis of the US strategy in Iraq post-invasion, focusing on the challenges of nation-building, security, and the political and economic landscape. It outlines the limitations of the US approach and the potential consequences of its withdrawal.

Main Points

1. Acceptable Exit and US Objectives

• The US cannot afford to lose in Iraq, as it has already achieved several prewar goals:

  • Removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime.
  • Reduction of Iraq’s threat in terms of proliferation and conventional military power for at least a decade.
  • Prevention of Iraq from playing a major military role in future Arab-Israeli conflicts.

• However, the US cannot expect Iraq to become a model of democracy or capitalism, nor can it create an "example" of its military prowess due to the challenges of asymmetric warfare.

2. Post-Exit Political Uncertainty

• The political situation in Iraq is likely to remain unstable, with no lasting constitution or rule of law established before the US leaves.
• Religious and ethnic tensions between Sunni and Shi'ite groups are expected to persist.
• The new Iraqi government will likely lack experienced leaders and will be difficult to sustain.
• US departure may lead to the collapse of the current government, as current leaders lack popular support and charisma.

3. Economic Challenges

• The US aid program is unlikely to lead to a comprehensive economic transformation.
• The US has not been able to secure key contracts, lacks a clear plan for modernizing oil infrastructure, and is abandoning efforts to privatize state industries and shift to a market-driven agricultural system.
• The schedule for sovereignty transfer is unrealistic, and the US must accept that the outcome will be an inefficient, messy transition.
• The aid process must be seen as a short-term effort to build political consensus, not a long-term restructuring plan.

4. Security Concerns

• The US may not be able to create a strong enough Iraqi military to defend the country after sovereignty is transferred.
• The New Iraqi Army is underdeveloped, with only one active battalion and limited capacity.
• The US has not yet created a viable mix of land, air, and naval forces for Iraq.
• The current security strategy has led to significant casualties, both for coalition forces and civilians.

5. Casualty Statistics

• US Casualties (March 19 – December 27, 2003):

  • 3,173 total casualties: 325 killed in action, 145 non-hostile killed, 2,333 wounded in action, and 370 nonhostile wounded.
  • Counterinsurgency phase (September 1 – December 27, 2003):
    • 1,354 casualties: 145 killed in action, 1,209 wounded in action.
    • Insurgent casualties:
      • Estimated between 7,950 to 9,800 Iraqis killed.

• Casualties by Region:

6. The Political Process

• The US should reduce its involvement in selecting Iraq’s leaders and shaping its government.
• The goal is to ensure the new government protects human rights, minimizes sectarian and ethnic divisions, and promotes democratic pluralism.
• The US must accept that Iraq’s political process may be as chaotic as its early history and that it has the right to make its own mistakes.

7. Costs of Staying the Course

• The US faces significant costs in terms of aid, casualties, and strategic credibility.
• The aid program is expensive and may not be effective in the long term.
• The US must avoid a "cut and run" strategy, as it would damage its credibility and lead to further instability.
• The document warns that any premature withdrawal would be perceived as a sign of weakness and could lead to long-term regional conflicts.

8. Strategic Implications

• The US needs to leave a legacy that encourages Iraqi cooperation and political stability.
• A longer-term aid strategy should be conditional on Iraqi progress and stability.
• The US must avoid creating a situation where its presence is seen as a threat or an occupation.
• The US should focus on creating Iraqi-led security and military forces that cross religious and ethnic lines.

Key Information

• Iraqi Demographics: 75-80% Arab, 15-20% Kurdish, 5% others; 97% Muslim (60-65% Shi'a, 32-37% Sunni).
• Economic Context: Iraq’s GDP in 2002 was $15.6 billion, with oil revenues accounting for 95% of all exports.
• US Aid and Military Spending: Total US aid appropriation through 2004 is $21.6 billion, with $18.7 billion in 2004 alone.
• Casualty Trends: The counterinsurgency phase saw significantly higher casualties than major combat operations.
• Security Forces: The New Iraqi Army is underdeveloped, with limited capacity and potential for future instability.
• Regional Threats: Iraq’s neighbors (Iran, Syria, Turkey) pose military threats, and the regional environment is unlikely to be secure post-exit.

Conclusion

The document emphasizes that the US must accept the limitations of its role in Iraq and focus on creating conditions for Iraqi self-governance rather than imposing its own vision. It warns against both premature withdrawal and overambitious nation-building goals, advocating for a pragmatic, conditional approach to aid and security. The long-term success of Iraq will depend largely on its own political and economic choices, and the US must ensure it leaves with a legacy of support and stability, not a symbol of occupation.