战略与国际研究中心-The-Military-Effectiveness-Of-Desert-Fox_-A-Warning-About-the-Limits-of-the-Revolution-in-Military-Affairs-and-Joint-Vision-2010_35页_156kb
报告摘要
Summary of "The Military: Effectiveness of Desert Fox: A Warning About the Limits of the Revolution in Military Affairs and Joint Vision 2010"
Core Content
This document, authored by Anthony H. Cordesman, provides a critical analysis of the Desert Fox operation in 1998, questioning the effectiveness of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Joint Vision 2010 military doctrine. It highlights the limitations of relying solely on technological superiority and the strategic and political blind spots of modern military planning.
Main Points
1. Desert Fox as a Tactical Success, Strategic Failure
- Tactical Success: Desert Fox was a successful air campaign with minimal casualties and significant use of precision-guided weapons.
- Strategic Limitations: Despite this, the operation failed to achieve major strategic objectives such as dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, weakening Saddam's regime, or securing long-term political stability in the region.
- Political Impact: The operation failed to change Iraqi behavior or create a lasting political impact. It is argued that the RMA and Joint Vision 2010 focus too much on military efficiency and technological superiority, ignoring the political and strategic realities of warfare.
2. Limitations of the RMA and Joint Vision 2010
- Overemphasis on Conventional Warfare: These doctrines assume clear military objectives and exposed enemy forces, which is not applicable to unconventional or guerrilla warfare.
- Inability to Address WMD and Political Targets: The RMA fails to account for dispersion, deception, and civilian infrastructure used for WMD production and storage.
- Underestimation of Real-World Challenges: The RMA and Joint Vision 2010 ignore the real-world inefficiencies of deploying advanced technology, including the need for extensive testing, upgrades, and maintenance.
3. Desert Fox and the Gulf War: A Comparative Analysis
| Aspect | Desert Storm (1991) | Deliberate Force (1995) | Desert Fox (1998) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Aircraft | 2400 (1800 US) | 300 | 213+ |
| Total Cruise Missiles | 333 | 23 | 425+ (90 CLCM, 425 SLCM) |
| Guided Smart Weapons | 9500 | 700 | 90%+ |
| Total Strikes | 42,600 | - | 1,075-1,165 |
| Air Strikes | 42,000 | - | 300 night sorties, 600 ordnance |
| WMD Targets | 32/9670 | - | 11/- |
| Command & Control Targets | 163/1500 | - | 20/- |
| Leadership/Government Targets | 45/200 | - | 19/- |
| POL Targets | 28/540 | - | 1/- |
| Missiles Targets | 61/1,460 | - | 11/- |
| SAM/IADS Targets | 120/1,730 | - | 32/- |
| Military Industry Targets | 25/975 | - | 1/- |
4. Political and Strategic Implications
- Limited Impact on WMD Programs: The US failed to significantly damage Iraq's WMD infrastructure, with over 80% of facilities not identified or targeted.
- UN Inspection Program at Risk: The operation likely ended the UN weapons inspection program in Iraq, increasing distrust among Arab nations and international allies.
- Arab Hostility and Limited Support: The US gained very little support from Arab allies, and faced broad hostility in the region, suggesting political failure.
- Strategic Regime Change Unattained: There was no clear plan for post-war stability or regime change, and Saddam's regime remained intact.
5. Damage Assessment and Realities
- Initial Damage Assessments: On December 17, only 8 targets were confirmed as destroyed or severely damaged, with many others only lightly damaged or not damaged at all.
- Incomplete Targeting: Many WMD-related targets were not effectively targeted, and collateral damage was not fully accounted for.
- Lack of Clear Strategic Outcome: The operation's success was measured in terms of tactical strikes, not strategic or political outcomes.
6. Military and Financial Challenges
- Underfunding of the RMA: The US is not spending enough on military modernization, with annual budgets far below the $75 billion needed to sustain the RMA.
- Congressional Inaction: Despite the RMA's demands, the Congress has failed to provide adequate funding, instead prioritizing pork-barrel spending and partisan politics.
- Human Costs: The military is underpaid, underfunded for readiness, and over-deployed, with no significant improvements in retirement benefits or force structure.
Key Takeaways
- Desert Fox was a tactical success but strategically blind.
- RMA and Joint Vision 2010 are overly optimistic about military technology and force projection, ignoring political and strategic dimensions.
- Precision weapons do not guarantee political outcomes or long-term stability.
- Damage assessments were incomplete and uncertain, with limited impact on Iraq's WMD programs and strategic infrastructure.
- The US faces serious challenges in military funding, force readiness, and political legitimacy in the region.
Conclusion
The document concludes that Desert Fox serves as a warning about the limitations of the RMA and the myopic focus of Joint Vision 2010. It emphasizes that military effectiveness alone is not enough to achieve strategic and political goals, and that real-world complexities must be taken into account in military planning.
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