2022-10-18-兰德-兰德-中国和俄罗斯对美国太空军事活动的看法和反应（英）_80页_807kb

报告摘要

总结

issue:
Since the 1980s, U.S. military activities and space policy have evolved significantly, including the establishment of U.S. Space Command and the creation of the U.S. Space Force. These developments have raised concerns about the increasing militarization, congestion, and contestation of space. Surprisingly, there has been little open-source analysis of how China and Russia perceive these U.S. activities.

approach:
To address this gap, RAND researchers analyzed Chinese and Russian primary sources, such as government publications, military journals, academic reports, and domestic media. They identified ten key U.S. "events" in the space domain to focus their analysis, including the Strategic Defense Initiative, the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and Operation Burnt Frost. By examining these events, the researchers assessed how Chinese and Russian perceptions of U.S. military activities in space have changed over time.

findings:
Chinese and Russian primary sources consistently reflect a perception of U.S. military activities in space as threatening. This perception stems from concerns about U.S. intentions to militarize space, particularly regarding nuclear deterrence and counterspace capabilities. The longer-term military potential of U.S. activities shapes this view, rather than the immediate impact of specific events. Both China and Russia exhibit a confirmation bias, reinforcing the idea of hostile intent whenever possible. However, there is also an attempt to balance rhetoric by characterizing U.S. actions as threatening while downplaying their own similar capabilities. Additionally, China and Russia appear to be responding to U.S. actions by pursuing asymmetric responses to avoid a full-scale arms race.

One key finding is that the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 appears to have triggered significant Russian actions, including increased investment in missile defense programs and the development of new weapons like antisatellite capabilities. Similarly, while Chinese responses are harder to trace directly to specific U.S. actions, they too reflect a pattern of reaction to perceived threats.

Finally, the study highlights that U.S. policymakers should be modest in their ability to anticipate Chinese perceptions of U.S. space activities, as diplomatic history and cultural understanding between the U.S. and China differ significantly from those between the U.S. and Russia. This difference may affect how future U.S. actions are perceived in China.